The Proper Legal Regime for \u27Cyberspace\u27 by Hardy, I. Trotter
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1994
The Proper Legal Regime for 'Cyberspace'
I. Trotter Hardy
William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 1994 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Hardy, I. Trotter, "The Proper Legal Regime for 'Cyberspace'" (1994). Faculty Publications. 656.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/656
THE PROPER LEGAL REGIME FOR "CYBERSPACE" 
I. Trotter Hardy* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Introduction ........... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 994 
II. What Makes a Legal Issue "New?" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 996 
A. Examples of Problems That Are Not "New" . . . . . 999 
B. New Twists on Old Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1000 
C. Why Are the Defamation and Copyright Cases 
New?....................................... 1002 
D. The Playboy Case and Copyright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1006 
E. Corporate E-mail Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1008 
F. Custom Diverges from Real Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1009 
G. Anonymous Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010 
H. Obscenity and Local Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1012 
I. Reasonableness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1013 
J. Labeling Files. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 
III. How Do Rules Regulating Behavior Arise? . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 
A. Unilateral Self-Help: Stay Away... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1016 
B. Law Merchant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1019 
C. Custom in Public International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1022 
IV. What Types of Rules Work Best?................... 1025 
A. Pure Self-Help . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1026 
B. Contract Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1028 
C. Privacy in the Corporate Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1032 
D. Transaction Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033 
E. Custom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1036 
F. Defining "Reasonableness" Through Custom. . . . . . 1040 
G. Must System Administrators Read the Mail?..... 1041 
H. Anonymous Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1048 
I. International Torts.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1051 
V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053 
* Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia. 
E-mail address: thardy @ mail.wm.edu. 
993 
994 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:993 
I. INTROIJUCTION 
Much commentary in the popular and legal press these days raises 
legal questions relating to electronic communications over computer 
networks.1 Popularly, the world of such communications is often called 
"cyberspace," a term that this article will also use as a convenient 
shorthand. Many academics and practicing lawyers are kept busy try-
ing to answer those questions by determining how existing rules, such 
as those governing copyright or libel, apply to communications in 
cyberspace.2 Implicit in the attention that both lawyers and the media 
are paying to the legal issues of cyberspace is the notion that cyber-
space raises important and challenging new legal issues. 
As one active cyberspace user has put it, in discussing an analogy 
between attempted break-ins of real property and attempted "break-
ins" to a computer account, "I suggest that the problem in analyzing 
this matter is applying analogies from the everyday world in the first 
place. Things are different enough in Cyberia that our customary para-
digms frequently don't fit. A person's computer account is not analo-
gous to a store. It's far more personal turf to my mind. We may just 
need new rules."3 This is not an isolated comment; others active in the 
on-line world have noted that in applying existing law to cyberspace 
"old analogies just don't cut it."' 
The purpose of this article is in part to assess these notions: does 
the existence of widespread computer-assisted communica-
tions-cyberspace-really raise novel legal issues? Or does it raise the 
1. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on Global 
Computer Networks, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1993); Scott Dean, Cyberspace: The Final Frontier; 
Courts, Users Grapple with Legal Issues Surrounding Computer Bulletin Boards, PA. L.J., Apr. 
12, 1993, at 1; Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, The First Amendment, and Equal Access to 
Electronic Networks, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. Spring 1992, at 65; Terri A. Cutrera, Note, The 
Constitution in Cyberspace: The Fundamental Rights of Computer Users, 60 UMKC L. REv. 139 
(1991); Sharon F. DiPaolo, Comment, The Application of the Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-
201 Statute of Frauds to Electronic Commerce, 13 J.L. & CoM. 143 (1993); Robert Ritter, E-
mail Laws Changing; Judicial and Legislative Notice of the New Ways We Communicate, THE 
QuiLL, Oct., 1993, at 24; Vic Sussman, Policing the Digital World, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., 
Dec. 6, 1993, at 68. 
2. See, e.g., Rosalind Resnick, A Shingle in Cyberspace; Lawyers Online Find Clients-and 
Some Risks, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 27, 1993, at 1. 
3. Message from Bob Dunne to the CYBERIA-L listserv list (an open discussion group 
available over the Internet), comparing trying to "break in" to a computer with trying to break 
into a house. Friday, Oct. 8, 1993. 
4. Shari Steele, Comments at Newjuris: A Conference on Law in Cyberspace 31 (Oct. 
1993) (transcript of the electronic conference edited by Trotter Hardy, on file with the University 
of Pittsburgh Law Review). 
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same issues that lawyers have had to grapple with for decades, only in 
a different medium? The article will conclude that popular concern 
over the legal questions of cyberspace arises in some instances when, in 
fact, there is no "new" issue worth discussing. A more important con-
clusion, however, is that many of the circumstances of cyber-Space do 
indeed give rise to new legal questions. 
Another task of this ~rticle will be to determine what it is that 
makes a cyberspace issue "new" and hence worth the attention of com-
mentators and those who are in a position to make or influence the 
making of rules about conduct. 
This article will try to do more than just identify and characterize 
the cyberspace issues that are "new." In addition, we need to address 
the question of their best resolution. Should these issues provoke a leg-
islative response, a case-by-case judicial response, or are there yet other 
mechanisms by which disputes may be avoided and resolved? 
Recognizing that some cyberspace legal issues are new, some com-
mentators and cyberspace users will inevitably call for prompt and spe-
cific legislation or regulation to clarify the problems. A statutory re-
sponse along these lines has the virtue of bringing immediate clarity to 
immediate problems. 
Of course, a specific statutory response is only one of many legal 
reactions. Case-by-case adjudication and its common law build-up of 
precedents can also be applied to cyberspace legal issues as well; an 
international convention can enact uniform model laws; citizens can 
create their own customs; service providers can specify behavior in their 
"part" of cyberspace through contracts; a modest degree of anarchy 
may even be desirable. Therefore, a second purpose of this article will 
be to discuss some of the other mechanisms by which individuals may 
regulate their conduct, including contracts, private associations, and 
custom. 
Each of these and other forms of "self regulation" have an appro-
priate place. Some may be applicable to certain issues, and others may 
not. A third purpose of this article, therefore, will be to determine 
under what circumstances each of these different mechanisms for rule 
creation is most appropriate for several illustrative problems that are 
beginning to arise in cyberspace. The list of problems is by no means 
exhaustive. This article will conclude that the rapidly changing technol-
ogy of computer communications implies a need for flexible legal regu-
lation of behavior, and that flexible regulation in turn implies a pre-
sumption that the most decentralized rules should be applied whenever 
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possible. This will often entail contractual agreements worked out 
among the affected parties, rather than a broadly-applicable judicial or 
legislative resolution. 
In examining all these questions, this article will draw on a num-
ber of readily-accessible materials, cited in the notes, but also on the 
author's own direct experience in one part of cyberspace, the lnternet.5 
In particular, two electronic conferences that the author has conducted 
over the Internet, one on electronic mail ("e-mail") and its affect on 
law practice and teaching, and the second on an issue germane to this 
article: whether cyberspace should be treated as a separate legal juris-
diction. This article will rely on the insights from both conferences 
from time to time. 6 
II. WHAT MAKES A LEGAL ISSUE "NEW?" 
The question of whether an issue in cyberspace or elsewhere is 
"new" is largely a subjective determination. At a shallow level _of anal-
ysis, every new medium is fraught with complex new legal questions, 
the most fundamental among them being whether existing laws 
designed with other media in mind should be applied to the new me-
dium as well. On the other hand, at the deepest or most general level of 
analysis, no legal questions are unique: they all involve human conflict. 
The trick is knowing when to take a shallower and when a deeper view. 
Why view a question as interesting and new when a more abstract and 
general view will always result in the question's being seen as simply 
"old hat?" Or vice-versa: why view a question as "old hat" when a 
closer, more detailed look, will always result in the question appearing 
novel? There is a tension between characterizations at these two ends 
of the spectrum. Viewing an issue in a very high-level, general way, 
saves the trouble of having to create new rules and maintains an im-
pression that the existing body of law is fairly stable, is modest in size, 
and hence is comprehensible. 
The drawback to a very general view of problems and legal rules is 
5. The "Internet" is a loose term for a collection of computer networks that are "intercon-
nected" with one another such that electronic mail and other text can be sent and received among 
them. Roughly 20 million people are able to access the Internet today, and the number is growing. 
See generally John Matthews, A Million Subscribers a Month Can't Be Wrong, SUNDAY TIMES, 
June 26, 1994. 
6. A copy of the transcript of the jurisdiction conference is on file with the University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review. I am grateful to the participants for helping me to begin to clarify some 
of my own thinking about the law of cyberspace, and therefore in indirectly helping me to write 
this article. 
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that the application of an existing body of such rules to any given prob-
lem is unpredictable. We could, for example, send every case-whether 
arising from cyberspace or real space-to a jury with the sole instruc-
tion that the jury should "Bring about justice between these parties as 
you think best." That would allow us to have a very simple legal system 
(at least in appearance, if not in fact) and to accommodate technologi-
cal change without any alterations to that system. 
We do not do that, of course, because we also prize the consistency 
of decisions; we fear that such a high level of generality in the law 
would lead to inconsistent outcomes and an inability of citizens to order 
their affairs to comply with the law. Wildly varying outcomes from 
similar facts would strongly suggest a denial of due process and a basic 
unfairness that would tend to erode respect for the rule of law. That is 
why narrowly-drawn specific rules have appeal. 
Let us put these remarks into the perspective of a particular cyber-
space example. Suppose a cyberspace user receives an interesting per-
sonal message by electronic mail from a friend. This recipient decides 
to forward a copy of the message, also by electronic mail, to a third 
party. The third party, who does not know the message's author, then 
decides to forward the message to all the members of an on-line discus-
sion group (for example, Internet "listserv" list or a Compuserve or 
America OnLine forum). Perhaps this forum has several hundred 
members, all of whom now receive the original message. 
Does the original author of the message, who, let us say, is un-
happy and surprised by this extensive publication of the message, have 
a cause of action against either the friend or the third party? 
At the shallowest (i.e., most detailed and specific) level of analysis, 
the answer is: who knows? Copying and forwarding mail is a common 
practice in cyberspace, but many cyber residents have not considered 
its possible unlawfulness and would doubtless be puzzled if they did. To 
be sure, there are laws of privacy and copyright in "real" space, but 
they were designed for a world in which copying a message to 
thousands of people took considerable time, effort and expense, and 
naturally gave the would-be forwarder pause for thought about issues 
such as privacy and copyright. With cyberspace, the argument goes, it's 
a new ball game. 
The facts may be generalized more abstractly, however: someone 
takes a work of authorship, makes thousands of copies of it, and dis-
tributes them to a segment of the public with no compelling educa-
tional, charitable, or other worthy-purpose reason for doing so. At this 
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level, the question is not new at all. It is, in fact, an easy case: the 
described conduct is clearly within the letter and spirit of the Copy-
right Act's prohibition against reproduction of copyrighted material 
without authorization.' 
This particular issue will not be resolved by this article, but the 
example is used to illustrate the tension between general and specific 
views of legal issues. The dilemma here-what is the "right" level of 
abstraction from which to view cyberspace legal issues-is identical to 
the dilemma of all legal interpretation. At some level of specificity, 
nearly all cases are different from others (the parties' names may dif-
fer, among other things). With greater generality, other cases begin to 
look to be "on all fours" with a given situation. 
In cyberspace, therefore, as elsewhere, the difficulty of formulating 
an issue arises because of the tension between conflicting desires. On 
the one hand is the desire for certainty, which argues for detailed, spe-
cific rules that are addressed to the cyberspace context. On the other 
hand is the desire to avoid the cumbersomeness of having a multiplicity 
of different rules for different situations.8 
It is impossible to draw a clear line between these two competing 
values, but roughly speaking, we should try to draw it on either of two 
bases. The first is that of costs and benefits: when the uncertainty sur-
rounding a legal issue is pervasive and hampers routine and desirable 
behavior, then a specific rule is worth having. When the uncertainty is 
minor and not a significant clog on routine behavior, then a specific 
rule will not be worth the additional complexity to our legal system. 
The second basis is that of policy: when the policy considerations that 
underlie an existing rule no longer make sense as applied to cyberspace, 
a new rule may be worth having. 
Admittedly, this guide is nebulous and subjective, but it is what 
implicitly guides the rest of this article in the identification of those 
legal issues in cyberspace that are "new" enough to merit a resolution 
specifically tailored for the cyberspace context. 
7. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1988). The privacy cause of action would 
likely be preempted. In any event, whether it would be preempted is independent of the cyber-
space connection. 
8. See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Shareholder Communication Rules and the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission: An Exercise in Regulatory Utility or Futility?, 13 J. CORP. L. 
683 (1988) (discussing tensions between keeping shareholders informed and creating too many 
unwieldy rules); Edward A. Jeffords, Home Audio Recording after Betamax: Taking a Fresh 
Look, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 855 (1984) (discussing the conflicting interests of preventing mass 
home copying of video tapes and creating complicated legislation). 
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A. Examples of Problems That Are Not "New" 
Some cyberspace issues seem wholly unremarkable: it is evident to 
any legal eye that they are readily governed by the same rules applica-
ble to other forms of communication. Suppose a cyberspace user writes 
a defamatory message about another user and intentionally sends it 
over the Internet to a dozen other individuals. Is this situation materi-
ally different from sending the same message by fax, mail, or tele-
graph? It is hard to see how it could be. The same ele-
ments-defamatory content, publication to third parties, perhaps 
actual malice, and so on-must be determined in the cyberspace libel 
case as elsewhere.9 Those issues seem indistinguishable from the same 
issues arising in a non-cyberspace context. In short, the fact that a 
communication was an electronic mail message on the Internet instead 
of a paper letter through the postal system makes little difference to 
the legal outcome. 
Most lawyers would quickly reach agreement that many cyber-
space issues are like the defamation example: they may or may not 
raise interesting legal questions (what is "defamatory?"), but whatever 
interesting questions they raise have nothing to do with the fact that 
the message was sent by e-mail. 
Similarly, we could substitute for the defamatory message in our 
hypothetical a message that discloses embarrassing personal informa-
tion about the same plaintiff. Again, assume that this revealing mes-
sage is sent to a dozen e-mail recipients. Would anyone seriously argue 
that the issues of invasion of privacy are different from the situation 
where a dozen paper letters were sent to the same recipients? The an-
swer is probably no. 
We can replicate this example with any number of twists and 
reach a similar conclusion. For example, an author submits a collection 
of poems to a publisher with a proposal for a publication contract. The 
poems and the proposed contract are sent through the medium of 
cyberspace. The publisher publishes the poems-whether in cyberspace 
or on paper-without ever agreeing to any contract. Does the author 
have a copyright infringement case? Of course-and the answer does 
not turn on whether the original submission was through cyberspace by 
e-mail or by letter or fax. 
None of these problems seems to raise any new issues because in 
9. For a more detailed list of elements, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 
(1977). 
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these cases "cyberspace" is simply a means of communication directly 
between human beings. There is nothing about the connection medium 
itself that matters here or that differs from other communication 
means; all that has happened is that one person has communicated a 
libel (or an infringing text, etc.) to third parties. When cyberspace is 
simply a medium of direct communication between people-much like 
the telephone, mail, or fax-we should expect that the legal issues will 
not be materially different from issues in "real" space. 
B. New Twists on Old Problems 
Clearly, then, a host of legal issues that can arise from computer 
communications do not pose any new legal questions, nor should they 
result in calls for new or revised legislation.10 On the other hand, there 
do appear to be legal issues that are not so quickly dismissed. 
For example, here is a slight variation on the "defamatory mes-
sage" hypothetical that seems to be more puzzling. Suppose that an 
individual (or company) has set up and now runs a "bulletin board 
system" or "BBS." For purposes of this article, "BBS" is a short-hand 
way of referring to any computer service available by way of electronic 
communications.11 The person who sets up and runs the BBS will be 
referred to as the "system administrator." 
Our hypothetical BBS provides its users, as most do, with a facil-
ity for reading and writing electronic mail. All such mail is stored on 
the BBS computer; a given message will be read by its recipient when 
the latter next makes a connection to the BBS computer. On reading 
such a message, this second user, the recipient, can reply to the mes-
sage, delete it, or both. 
Suppose further that BBS user Alice enters (or "posts" as the 
term is often used) a message addressed to BBS user Bob. The message 
falsely accuses another person, Charles, of criminal wrong-doing. No 
10. This is not to say that they will not be litigated; there will always be disputes over 
whether the elements of a cause of action have been met; there will always be ignorance over legal 
rules; there will always be those who violate known rules on the assumption that nothing will 
happen; and so on. My point here is simply that for some set of factual situations in cyberspace, 
the legal issues governing the situation will not be "ne~" in any helpful sense. 
11. Commonly a BBS will be a computer that can accept a remote electronic connection 
from users at distant sites, typically from users who themselves have a computer equipped with a 
modem that can dial up the BBS over a telephone line. An example of such a large BBS is 
Compuserve; small ones are run by hobbyists from desktop computers in their homes. In this 
article, "BBS" will be used more generally to include any on-line service such as a discussion list, 
newsgroup, or information repository like Lexis or Westlaw. 
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legal privilege justifies Alice's communication of this accusation. If Bob 
later connects to the BBS-let us say, two weeks later-reads the de-
famatory message and thinks ill of Charles because of it, clearly the 
requirements of a cause of action in defamation are satisfied for 
Charles against Alice, as the original sender of the message. The mes-
sage is defamatory by hypothesis, it has been intentionally "published" 
to a third party (Bob) without privilege, and we can assume it satisfies 
the other elements of defamation. 
Now comes the new wrinkle: does the cause of action also extend 
to the system administrator as defendant? Should the administrator, at 
some time in that two week period when he had ample opportunity to 
do so, have read and deleted the message or at least returned it to the 
sender with an explanatory note? 
We have no shortage of analogies and metaphors on this point. 
Indeed, a litigated case, Cubby v. Compuserve, 12 involved similar 
facts.13 The Cubby court tried to answer the legal question by referring 
to analogies involving libraries, newspapers, bookstores, and so on.14 In 
spite of this reliance on analogies, one senses that the court perceived 
that the computer BBS as the intermediary between the message's 
sender and recipient made the legal analysis different from the usual 
libel case involving these non-cyberspace analogs.111 At the very least it 
is noteworthy that plaintiff's counsel thought the situation was worth a 
court test and its attendant costs. The situation was not routinely cov-
ered by the existing law, which has grown up around bookstores. 
In short, the case seems to have the "feel" of a new issue in defa-
mation law, one that is new precisely because of the cyberspace connec-
tion. In a similar way, had the issue been invasion of privacy or copy-
right infringement, the question would have had the same 
uncomfortable fit with "real space" examples. 
12. Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
13. Compuserve contracted with a third party to maintain a "forum" or discussion area. 
This third party contracted with yet a fourth party, who uploaded a newsletter of sorts that con-
tained disparaging statements about a competing newsletter. The competing newsletter sued Com-
puserve. Id. at 137-38. 
14. Id. at 139 (citing to Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 235 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) and Macaluso v. Mondadori Publishing Co., 527 F. Supp. 1017, 1019 (E.D.N.Y. 
1981)). 
15. The court actually stressed that the discussion forum was maintained by subcontractors, 
implying that the issue might have been harder had the forum been directly under Compuserve's 
control. Id. at 140. I suggest that it would be harder yet if the issue had been a message or file 
uploaded by an individual subscriber to Compuserve. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37, 
122-38. 
1002 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:993 
Recently a similar copyright case was in fact decided in Playboy 
Enterprises v. Frena.16 The Playboy case featured what was apparently 
a desktop BBS17 that provided a nice contrast with the giant Prodigy 
BBS at issue in Cubby. 
The BBS in Playboy provided a service other than electronic mail, 
one very common with BBSs of all sizes: file sharing. Users have a 
facility provided to them for sending "files" to the BBS that other users 
may then copy onto their own computers. The process of sending files 
to a BBS is called "uploading;" obtaining a file from a BBS is called 
"downloading." "Files" can be computer programs, text, or graphic 
images. 
In the Playboy case, a BBS user had uploaded graphic images that 
were digital copies of various photographs that had appeared in Play-
boy magazine. Playboy asserted copyright in the photographs and could 
have proceeded against the uploader who made and uploaded copies of 
the photographs. Instead, the magazine sued the system administrator 
of the BBS, who claimed that he was unaware of the existence of the 
copied photographs. The court held that his knowledge (scienter) was 
not an essential element of copyright infringement and decided in favor 
of Playboy on a summary judgment motion. 
It is quite true that scienter is not a normal requirement of copy-
right infringement.18 Yet this case will trouble many cyberspace users. 
It certainly will trouble system administrators/9 for it seems to impose 
a near-impossible burden on them to screen all uploaded files. Many 
BBS systems experience hundreds of such uploads daily. 
C. Why Are the Defamation and Copyright Cases New? 
Why do the Cubby and Playboy cases seem new enough in their 
cyberspace incarnation to justify further legal consideration? Several 
answers can be suggested, all showing that the policy issues in cyber-
space are different from those of analogous "real" space situations. 
16. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
17. The opinion is not clear on this point, though the defendant's BBS was operated on a 
commercial basis: subscribers paid $25 per month or purchased products from the defendant in 
order to access the BBS. ld. at 1558. 
18. See Fitzgerald Publishing Co. v. Baylor Publishing Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1113 (2d Cir. 
1986); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d Cir. 1983); Herbert 
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1971); Arica Industries v. 
Palmer, 761 F. Supp. 1056, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Olan Mills v. Linn Photo Co., 795 F. Supp. 
1423, 1437 (N.D. Iowa 1991). 
19. I am one such person; I am the system administrator of a desktop BBS system myself. 
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The policies behind the rules of defamation liability for "real" 
space intermediaries like bookstores or libraries are nominally 
grounded in the observation that they should not be liable if they do 
not know or have reason to know of the defamatory content in the 
materials they carry.20 But this "scienter" requirement in fact begs the 
question: must the intermediary know, that is, must it affirmatively 
seek to discover defamatory matter? A better rationale for the rule is 
practicality: bookstores carry thousands of titles, each hundreds of 
pages long, and most of them are not digitized. It is impractical for a 
bookstore to review every page of every book it carries.21 Moreover, 
regardless of practicalities, nearly all bookstores operate similarly and 
would find review of their inventory equally practical or impractical. 
Therefore, a uniform bookstore exception to liability for republishing a 
libel makes sense. 22 
BBSs in cyberspace are not nearly so uniform, and the practicali-
ties of screening messages may differ. For example, a BBS may carry 
thousands of messages, but each is likely to be only a few lines long, 
and they are digitized. There is at least an argument, therefore, that 
BBSs are "able" unlike bookstores, to screen messages through com-
puterized text-searching techniques.23 Some system administrators op-
erate desktop BBSs that get a very low level of usage-a handful of 
messages a day-and charge no fees. It would be feasible (though not 
necessarily desirable) for them "manually" to review every message 
left on the system by actually reading them. On the other hand, large 
commercial BBSs like Prodigy and America OnLine serve as the mail 
box for thousands of messages a day; it is not feasible for those compa-
nies to examine every message. Indeed, that is what the Cubby court 
concluded.24 It is simply not true, in short, that an on-line BBS is "like 
a bookstore." Some are more like a bookstore and some less, and the 
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (1977): "[O]ne who only delivers or 
transmits defamatory matter published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if, he 
knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character." 
21. See Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing 
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959)). 
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmts. d, e, f and g (1977) (general dis-
cussion of news dealers, bookstores and libraries, transmitters of messages like telephone and tele-
graph companies, and radio and television broadcasting). 
23. I am making an argument here, but not one that I am enamored of. I understand the 
difficulty of "scanning" for defamatory language: it is not at all like "scanning" for profanity 
where a simple text search may be all that's necessary. 
24. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140. 
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tremendous variation should make a court uneasy about relying on ge-
neric "bookstore" analogies. 
Second, even though large BBSs are something like bookstores or 
newsstands, BBSs are still new to society and their social value is less 
well established. This observation is significant not in the sense that 
courts will be stymied solely because BBSs are new and different, 
though that may happen. Rather, it is significant in that the judicial 
determination that bookstores need not screen all their publications for 
content is implicitly based on the conclusion that bookstores perform a 
very useful service for society, one with which judges and juries are 
well acquainted. They are less well acquainted with the benefits of BBS 
services, and cannot therefore rely on the same instinctive sense of the 
value to society of such services. That fact alone will make most courts 
hesitate before relying art "real" space analogies. · 
A third difference between the system administrator as intermedi-
ary and other intermediaries in real space is that certain real space 
intermediaries like telephone and telegraph companies are common 
carriers. A common carrier has no choice but to carry messages and 
thus in a sense gains immunity from defamation, privacy, and copy-
right infringement claims in exchange for agreeing to provide service 
on the same terms to all members of the public. Today it is easily possi-
ble, and common, for an individual or business simply to decide to be a 
cyberspace intermediary,25 that is, to become a system administrator 
whose system serves as a store-and-forward message service and infor-
mation repository for others, without the system administrator having 
to gain any governmental, regulatory approval or implicitly agree to 
rules applicable to common carriers. 
Communications common carriers historically held a monopoly po-
sition in a given locality. Computer-based system administrators, in 
contrast, have proliferated with abandon today. In any city of size, 
there will scores of desktop BBSs and any of several large commercial 
systems to which one may have access. With this much competition 
there is little justification for considering BBS messaging systems to be 
"natural monopolies." 
Nor do the smaller BBSs illustrate the characteristics of common 
carriers such as marketing to the public generally.26 Many small BBSs 
do not "market" their services, and when they do, they are likely to 
25. Setting up one's own desktop BBS requires a personal computer, modem, appropriate 
software, and access to a phone line. The total cost can easily be under $2000. 
26. Perritt, supra note l, at 93. 
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advertise themselves through other BBSs, not to the public generally. 
Even larger BBSs may only advertise in computer specialty magazines. 
Moreover, many small BBSs do not charge for access, so the whole 
common carrier concept of uniform fees for service is inapplicable. Fi-
nally, the conclusion that a BBS is a "common carrier," may have the 
effect of triggering a vast array of regulatory responses27 that would be 
wholly inappropriate for most smaller BBSs, and, with competition as 
keen as it is, wholly unnecessary for even the largest commercial BBSs. 
A final difference between BBSs and bookstores is that nearly all 
bookstores and newsstands will carry materials from reliable publish-
ers-that is, publishers who will remain in business and remain able to 
supply materials on a regular and predictable basis. Like other retail 
establishments, bookstores have a strong incentive not to stock materi-
als from wholesalers who may be here today and gone tomorrow. The 
consequence of this self-interest by bookstores is that defamed plaintiffs 
will nearly always be able to turn to the publisher of the defamatory 
material for redress; they will have no strong incentive to include the 
bookstore as a defendant. More to the point, the ready availability of 
publishers as defendants means that courts will not feel any pressure to 
include the bookstore in the scope of defamation liability in order to 
provide compensation to the plaintiff. 
With cyberspace intermediaries, the situation is very different.28 
An enormous amount of communication in cyberspace is made by indi-
viduals, rather than by centralized and typically solvent publishing 
businesses. Photocopy machines at one time threatened to turn every 
individual into a mass publisher, but cyberspace seems actually to have 
achieved that distinction in a way that photocopying never really did. 
Moreover, individual "publishers" who make use of desktop BBS sys-
tems that charge no fees have the option of remaining anonymous; 
whether solvent or not, they may be impossible to identify by the par-
ties they are capable of defaming. 
In sum, the policies behind relieving "real space" intermediaries, 
of defamation liability are not clearly applicable in cyberspace, or at 
least not uniformly applicable because (1) the practicalities of screen-
27. /d. at 94-95. 
28. BRUCE W. SANFORD. LIBEL AND PRIVACY 48 § 2.7.4 (2d ed. 1991) ("Distinctions be-
tween those properly liable and those who are innocent middlemen are less clear in electronic 
publishing systems, particularly the 'interactive' type where subscribers can put their own 
messages into circulation."). Sanford suggests that a public access cable television channel might 
find its position "halfway between that of a telephone or telegraph service . . . and a regular news 
publisher." !d. By analogy, the same could be said of a BBS. 
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ing messages for defamatory content differ from BBS to BBS; (2) the 
value of intermediaries in real space situations is far more well estab-
lished than the value of on-line intermediaries; (3) those intermediaries 
in real space that are common carriers have made trade-offs in the 
form of universal carriage and often monopoly positions that cyber-
space system administrators do not typically make; and finally, (4) sol-
vent publishers as potential defendants are more likely to exist in real 
space intermediary situations than in cyberspace. The applicable legal 
rules of defamation and privacy invasion surrounding the system ad-
ministrator as intermediary are therefore sufficiently uncertain to make 
them "new" enough to merit attention.29 
D. The Playboy Case and Copyright 
Thus far, we have been speaking particularly of defamation, but 
with the copyright example of the Playboy case, the situation is much 
the same. Recall that in Playboy a system administrator of a BBS was 
found liable for copyright infringement, despite his professed ignorance 
of the infringement, because scienter was not a requirement of copy-
right infringement. 
The no-scienter cases in copyright law appear to be justified by the 
underlying policy that ignorance of the law is no excuse: We do not 
want to encourage citizens to try to be "willfully ignorant," and we do 
not want to face the exceedingly difficult task in litigation of separating 
"true" ignorance from "deliberate" ignorance. Implicit in this policy 
applied to copyright is the belief that "ignorant" copyright infringers 
should be made liable so that they will educate themselves and be on 
guard against the possibility that they may be infringing another's 
rights the next time. 30 
This makes a great deal of practical sense in many "no scienter" 
cases in copyright. A typical case involves a defendant earning money 
from copyrighted music. The defendants are often the owner of a 
nightclub, a bar that hires bands to perform live music,31 the proprietor 
of a store, an entertainment attraction that plays recorded music, or 
29. For a good example of the attention these issues merit, see Perritt, supra note 1, at 95-
110. 
30. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 9.4, at 162 (1989). 
31. See, e.g., Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n, 
Inc., 554 F.2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977); Chess Music, Inc. v. Sipe, 442 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Minn. 
1977). 
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the radio.32 These defendants may genuinely not know that they need a 
license for their activities, but once they know, they know: further use 
of music without a license will lead to further infringement suits; the 
obtaining of the necessary license will solve the problem.33 Even with 
other copyright industries, such as book publishing and television, 
which are also held to a no-scienter or strict liability standard,34 the 
volume of possibly copyright infringing submissions is relatively 
manageable. 
With the extremely wide variation in the size of BBSs in cyber-
space, however, this same policy of discouraging actual or willful igno-
rance is far from uniformly applicable. For example, there will cer-
tainly be systems with a very few files that do not change much over 
time, where each file is well known to the system administrator. Hold-
ing such a system administrator liable for copyright infringement 
might have the salutary effect of encouraging the administrator to be 
more on guard next time. But much larger BBS systems are also com-
mon, ones with thousands of files and perhaps dozens or hundreds of 
these files uploaded or downloaded every day by dozens or hundreds of 
users.35 It is not feasible for the system administrator of such a large 
system actually to look at every file uploaded, nor is there a reliable 
method of computer screening for these files. For that matter, there is 
no reliable method of manual screening, even if the system administra-
tor could take the time to do so. A user could easily upload a third 
party's copyrighted short story, for example, claiming it as his own. 
How would the system administrator know whether it was the 
uploader's original work or not? Any number of other such files fall 
into a similar category, such as computer software that the uploader 
claims to have written, art work the uploader claims to have drawn, 
and so on. 
The volume of uploads and downloads, the ease of copying, and 
32. See, e.g., Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle, 31 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1929); Broadcast Music, 
Inc. v. Regal Broadcasting Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. 624 (N.D.N.Y. 1981). 
33. Usually a license would be obtained from ASCAP and BMI; between them, they hold 
the rights to nearly all U.S. music. 
34. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 30, § 1.15, at 44-45. 
35. At least one BBS is run by an individual-not by Compuserve, or America On-Line, or 
other such system-that is based on a desktop computer and that carried, as of January 27, 1994, 
a total of 11,063 files for its users to download. It held a total of 45,782 electronic mail messages. 
This is high for a desktop system but not at all unheard of. The total number of BBSs in the U.S. 
alone is estimated by Boardwatch, a magazine that follows BBS issues, to be about 60,000. More 
than 12 million Americans call into a BBS every day. Kathleen Doler, INv. Bus. DAILY, Feb. 17, 
1994, Computers and Automation Sec., at 4. 
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the wide array of copyrightable materials that can travel in cyberspace, 
all make BBS administrators poorly suited to the standards of "knew 
or ought to have known" about the copyright status of information held 
on their systems. Unlike a bar or club where music is played, system 
administrators cannot know in any general sense whether or not the 
files being up- and down-loaded from their systems should be treated 
with the gingerliness appropriate for commercially valuable copy-
righted materials. 
To be sure, there are some real-space intermediaries who will be 
unable to know the copyrighted status of works they review, such as 
book publishers or movie producers.36 Yet applying the no-scienter pol-
icy to them still makes sense because the sheer volume of materials 
coming to them will be far less than the volume of materials arriving 
daily on some large BBSs. For a number of reasons, then, the role of 
the system administrator with regard to uploaded copyright-infringing 
materials seems different from real space analogs and hence "new" 
enough to be worthy of further attention.37 
E. Corporate E-mail Privacy 
Electronic mail privacy issue deserves mention because it is fre-
quently discussed in the popular press38 and is the subject of recently 
introduced legislation.39 The question is whether employees have a pri-
vacy right in their electronic mail messages. Should employees be able 
to send notes to other employees or others outside the workplace with-
out worrying that their messages will be read by a supervisor? On the 
other hand, should employers have a right to know whether their em-
ployees are revealing trade secrets or engaging in other wrongful con-
duct by way of e-mail?40 
Note that this question is slightly different from the previous ex-
36. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 30, § 1.15 at 45 ("Copyright law's rule of strict liability 
poses particularly hard problems for an intermediary, such as a book publisher or motion picture 
producer .... " (footnote omitted)). 
37. This article will later conclude, incidentally, that in spite of these policy differences 
between real space and cyberspace intermediaries, strict liability ought to apply to system admin-
istrators in this circumstance, on grounds that other policies besides "ignorance is no excuse" 
make such a result desirable. See infra text accompanying notes 126-38. 
38. See, e.g., James McNair, Just How Private Is That Message?, WASH. PosT, Feb. 14, 
1994, Wash. Bus. Supp. at 17. 
39. S. 984, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (the "Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act"); 
H.R. 1900, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (companion bill). 
40. See Stephen K. Yoder, High-Tech Firm Cries Trade-Secret Theft, Gets Scant Sympa-
thy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1992, at Al. 
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amples. In those examples we looked at the question whether a system 
administrator should be required to look at mail or files from users that 
might be "wrongful" in relation to some third party. In the employ-
ment setting, we are asking whether the employer, who in this context 
is the "system administrator," should be allowed to look at mail in-
tended for third parties that might be wrongful with respect to the 
employer. 
Once the employment situation is looked at in this light, it be-
comes obvious why this situation is also "new" enough to merit atten-
tion: just as in the defamation and copyright examples, we have a sys-
tem administrator as intermediary, one that is not a common carrier 
and with whom society has little experience and hence is unable to 
make an accurate assessment of value. As before, we can also expect 
wide variation in the scope of the system administrator's activities in 
regard to employees' privacy and in the scale and extent to which em-
ployees use e-mail at work. 
Consequently, despite the reversal of the role of system adminis-
trator and the legal question-a shift from whether the system admin-
istrator should be required to read to whether the system administrator 
should be allowed to read-the fundamental question of corporate e-
mail privacy strikes us as new because of the system administrator's 
role as a communications intermediary. 
F. Custom Diverges from Real Space 
The presence of the cyberspace system administrator as intermedi-
ary, with widely varying capabilities and opportunities for screening 
those documents for which the administrator is the intermediary, thus 
raises some interesting new questions. Another set of vexing questions 
seems certain to arise from this fact: a cyberspace community is quite 
likely to develop its own customs, ones that differ significantly from 
those of real space. To rely once again on the copyright issue, for ex-
ample, we can look at the well recognized cyberspace custom of copy-
ing e-mail messages and forwarding them to others. In real space, this 
might be a clear copyright violation, but if everyone in cyberspace 
"does it all the time," and knows that others do it all the time, might 
not some sort of estoppel or implied waiver of copyright rights arise? 
This sort of situation, where custom conflicts with established in-
tellectual property law, has happened before. The usual rule of copy-
right is that rough ideas cannot be protected. Only when an idea is 
sufficiently developed to be an "expression" does copyright attach. At-
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tempts to protect ideas under other, state law theories, usually fail as 
well. For example, in Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motors Co.;n the plain-
tiff had submitted suggestions to General Motors for the placement of 
various mechanical components in the engine compartments of Chevro-
lets. General Motors adopted the suggestions without payment to the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff sued on a state law theory but lost, on grounds 
that the idea was not sufficiently "novel" or "concrete."42 
Yet, when a strong industry custom exists, the results may contra-
dict these well-established copyright and state law rules. For example, 
in the early days of radio broadcasting, it became the industry custom 
to buy and sell rough radio series concepts-exactly the sort of thing 
that would likely fail to achieve copyright protection for being only an 
idea, and fail to achieve state law protection for lack of sufficient nov-
elty and concreteness. Here, then, was a situation in which the intellec-
tual property laws did not provide the property right on which a whole 
industry depended. Under those circumstances, one court, in Cole v. 
Phillips H. Lord, Inc.,43 recognized the industry custom as sufficiently 
strong to achieve judicial deference and recognition. In effect, the court 
created a pseudo-copyright right where such a right conflicted with 
copyright law but accorded with industry custom. 
Customs are developing in cyberspace as they might in any com-
munity, and rapid growth in computer communications suggests that 
there may be a great many such customs before long. Many of these 
customs conflict with "real" space customs. As with the Cole case, a 
court might be persuaded to recognize a cyberspace industry custom as 
legally enforceable even though it differed from the rule applicable in 
real space. The potential for judicial recognition of this practice is an-
other reason why interesting new questions will arise in cyberspace. 
G. Anonymous Messages 
Strikingly lower costs for cyberspace communications will bring 
other activities to the forefront of our interest as well. These activities 
are possible in some sense in "real" space but are so much more costly 
there that they do not pose a real problem. It is possible, for example, 
with the cooperation of one or more intermediary computers, to create 
41. Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F.2d 345, 345-47 (8th Cir. 1934). 
42. Id. at 348. 
43. 28 N.Y.S.2d 404, 409 (N.Y. App. Div. 1941); see also Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90, 
93 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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and send an "anonymous" electronic message through cyberspace-a 
message whose originator cannot be ascertained;'" 
What are the problems of anonymous messages? They are just the 
sorts of things we have been addressing: What if an anonymous mes-
sage is libelous? Infringes copyright? Sends trade secrets to others? 
The obvious answer is for a court to subpoena the records of the inter-
mediary computer, the one that strips off the sender's identifying infor-
mation. Yet this may not be a practical answer if that computer sys-
tematically erases the records of its anonymously forwarded mail, or if 
the intermediary computer is located in a difficult to reach foreign 
jurisdiction. 45 
We have the capability of sending anonymous messages today, of 
course. Telephone calls can be made and letters can be sent without 
any identification of the sender.46 Yet telephone calls cannot easily and 
44. The computer used to strip off the sender's name and address is called an "anonymous 
re-mailer." These computers and their anonymous facility already exist. Personal conversation 
with Mike Godwin, COUNSEL FOR THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Feb. 4, 1994). 
45. Apparently anonymous remailer computers on the Internet exist in Finland, for exam-
ple. /d. I recently received a message that purported to be an invitation to use anonymous 
remailers to engage in the sale of "information" apparently in violation of any number of laws. I 
have no way of knowing whether the message was a joke, or was exactly what it claimed to be, 
but what it said was this: 
BlackNet is in the business of buying, selling, trading, and otherwise dealing with informa-
tion in all its many forms. Our location in physical space is unimportant. Our location in 
cyberspace is all that matters. Our primary address is the PGP key location: 
"blacknet<nowhere@cyberspace.nil>" and we can be contacted (preferably through a 
chain of anonymous remailers) by encrypting a message to our public key (contained be-
low) and depositing this message in one of the several locations in cyberspace we monitor. 
Currently, we monitor the following locations: alt.extropians, alt.fan.david-sternlight, and 
the "Cypherpunks" mailing list. 
BlackNet is nominally nonideological, but considers nation-states, export laws, patent 
laws, national security considerations and the like to be relics of the pre-cyberspace era. 
Export and patent laws are often used to explicitly project national power and imperialist, 
colonialist state fascism. BlackNet believes it is solely the responsibility of a secret holder 
to keep that secret-not the responsibility of the State, or of us, or of anyone else who may 
come into possession of that secret. If a secret's worth having, it's worth protecting. 
BlackNet is currently building its information inventory. We are interested in infor-
mation in the following areas, though any other juicy stuff is always welcome. "If you 
think it's valuable, offer it to us first."-trade secrets, processes, production methods (esp. 
in semiconductors)-nanotechnology and related techniques (esp. the Merkle sleeve bear-
ing)-chemical manufacturing and rational drug design (esp. fullerines and protein fold-
ing)-new product plans, from children's toys to cruise missiles (anything on 
"300"?)-business intelligence, mergers, buyouts, rumors. 
46. Whether telephone calls "should" be capable of anonymity is another debate, one that 
surrounds the use of "caller id" and "caller id blocking" features now offered to many telephone 
customers. For an indication of the problem's complexity, see Barasch v. Pa. Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 
576 A.2d 79 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990). 
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quickly be made to thousands of people, as can e-mail messages. And 
paper mail will usually have higher costs than e-mail, which serve as a 
significant deterrent. Paper mail also possesses identifiable characteris-
tics such as the type of paper or ink that make anonymity less certain 
than with e-mail. Of course, these identifying paper characteristics can 
be masked with sufficient expenditures of money, but again, the much 
lower costs for the same anonymous facility in cyberspace will make 
enough of a quantitative difference, despite the "real space" analogies, 
that we can consider the problem of anonymity as a "new" one. 
H. Obscenity and Local Communities 
Another source of new problems in cyberspace will arise from the 
fact that residents of cyberspace are also residents of "real" spaces; 
they will thus be members of two (or more) different communities. For 
rules, such as those on obscenity, that turn on some sort of "community 
standard,"47 this "dual citizenship" circumstance will likely prove vex-
ing indeed. 
There is already an exchange of pornographic images and dialog 
over cyberspace.48 Suppose a cyber resident physically located in Cleve-
land downloads an erotic image from a BBS also physically located in 
Cleveland and tells her friends in town about it, so that all of them 
later download the image. Suppose further that this small "cyberspace 
community" within the larger community of Cleveland is not offended 
by the image but that the citizenry of Cleveland as a whole would be. 
Assuming that Cleveland has an anti-pornography ordinance that 
punishes the "sale" or "display" of obscene material, may it enforce 
those laws against the BBS? Many of the commercial BBSs, such as 
America OnLine and Compuserve, provide images for downloading 
that are intended to be more-or-less erotic,49 making this example 
plausible 
There is an initial question about whether such images are actu-
ally being "sold," but assuming that they are (and certainly it is quite 
47. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973); see generally FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, 
THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 116-35 (1976). 
48. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Richard 
Leiby, AI Gore Takes a Spin on the Info Highway; A Few Potholes Mar "Electronic Town 
Meeting," WASH. PosT, Jan. 14, 1994, at G1, G2 ("(T]he superhighway is already clogged with 
porn .... ") (emphasis omitted). 
49. See Joel Garreau, Bawdy Bytes: The Growing World of Cybersex, WASH. PosT, Nov. 
29, 1993, at AI. 
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possible for such images to be charged-for individually), has the BBS 
violated the ordinance? There is at least a good argument that if the 
purpose of the ordinance is to control the moral tone of the community, 
then the ordinance has been violated. If the purpose is to prevent the 
display of images that may offend passers-by, however, there would be 
no violation because no one is a passer-by in this context. 
But even if the policy of the ordinance is to control the moral tone 
of the community, is it fair to hold the BBS responsible? After all, 
access to most BBSs is available with a phone call from anywhere, 
from any jurisdiction around the world, not just from a single commu-
nity with a particular standard of obscenity. Application of the "moral 
tone" policy seems wholly out of place. 
Whether one agrees with this analysis or not, the point is merely 
that the ability to belong to two communities, one physical and one 
electronic, is likely to cause new problems relating to community stan-
dards. For that matter, it makes little sense even today, and surely will 
make no sense tomorrow, to speak of one "cyberspace community." 
There are differing interest groups all across cyberspace. The problem 
of "dual citizenship" is therefore likely to be played out on an even 
larger scale, as cyberspace users become multiple-citizens of a bewil-
dering number .of electronic-and at least one physical--communities. 
I. Reasonableness 
Finally, a broader issue related to the "cyberspace community" 
standards question is what the "reasonable" person would do in a given 
circumstance. The concept of reasonableness is pervasive in Anglo-
American law, especially tort law. There is no inherent reason why the 
concept cannot apply in cyberspace. The problem is that in many situa-
tions, juries-and even cyberspace users themselves-may not know 
and may have no basis for knowing what is reasonable in cyberspace. 
Again, let us analyze a practical example. A mortgage finance 
company keeps extensive records on credit and other financial history 
information about thousands of clients on a computer in its office. The 
computer system is secured by a variety of access restrictions such as 
passwords, security levels, and so on. One day a disgruntled former em-
ployee figures out a way around the security features and, using com-
puter communications, copies thousands of confidential financial 
records. 
The question of the company's liability for negligence in permit-
ting the extraction of data in the first place can be handled unexcep-
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tionally: companies have long maintained data security practices, so 
that testimony on the reasonableness of this company's practices should 
be readily available. A harder question is whether, assuming that it can 
reconstruct all its data, the company nonetheless has a legal obligation 
to notify its customers of this "information theft." 
Is this question any different from a question about the theft of 
tangible goods from a bank vault? Suppose someone breaks into the 
vault and manages to rob every one of the safe deposit boxes. Suppose 
further that the bank recovers the stolen items. What is the obligation 
of the bank to notify deposit box renters? The answer may not be clear 
here either, but that is partly because this sort of incident has never 
happened before. Before the days of computers, wholesale theft of the 
valuables of thousands of people was impractical and unlikely. 
Now mass theft of information is possible. General tort principles 
can be applied, of course, to address the reasonableness or not of re-
porting the theft within some period of time. Arguments might be sup-
ported by the "duty to warn" cases much like those involving a psycho-
therapist's duty to notify a third party of a patient's threats to their 
well being.110 But whatever the arguments and analogies, any decision 
grounded in reasonableness, whether this bank example or any other, is 
a decision that draws on the experience and common sense of the jury. 
It is unlikely with these "information thefts" that a jury will have any 
useful common sense experience. Hence the question, at least for a 
time, will remain a novel one for cyberspace.111 
J. Labeling Files 
Other questions based on reasonableness are likely to arise until 
more of the reasonable practices of cyberspace are clarified, or indeed, 
until they develop in the first place. One such question is whether there 
is a requirement that a system administrator's files be given accurate, 
meaningful titles or descriptions. To put the question another way, can 
a system administrator be found liable for negligently mis-naming or 
describing files on his system? Or, can the system administrator be lia-
ble for the mis-description of files by those who uploaded them in the 
50. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976). 
51. To say that the jury will be unfamiliar with the custom of cyberspace is not, of course, 
to say that the jury cannot decide a case, perhaps with the aid of expert testimony. But it is to say 
that the first few such cases would presumably be difficult ones and hence would benefit from 
clarification. 
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first place-that is, for "permitting" misnamed files to reside on the 
system? 
The problem might arise in this fashion: a system administrator 
operates a BBS on which a mixture of general interest materials re-
sides. Access to each "area" on the BBS is open, but areas are labelled, 
apparently in accord with their content. One group of files might be 
labelled "shareware games," another "Windows utilities," and so on. 
Each of these areas contains some files that the system administrator 
has placed on the system and some files that have been uploaded by 
other BBS users without the active participation of the administrator. 
Suppose that a user has uploaded a file into the "Shareware 
Games" area under the file name "Chess." In fact, the game when 
executed turns out to be not a chess game at all, but a hard-core porno-
graphic video sequence. The parents of a twelve-year old have explored 
this BBS briefly and, on the basis of the area and file names, concluded 
that the BBS is suitable for their child. The child then innocently ac-
cesses the BBS, downloading "Chess," which the child executes to his 
and his parents' considerable surprise. 
Is the system administrator liable for the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress or on some other grounds to the child? Once again, 
the new role of the system administrator as intermediary brings this 
sort of question to the fore in a way that simply has not occurred and is 
not likely to occur with current technologies in real space. 
III. How Do RULES REGULATING BEHAVIOR ARISE? 
As has been shown, new legal problems from cyberspace are likely 
to arise for a number of reasons: existing policies behind real space 
analogs to cyberspace behavior may simply not apply, particularly re-
garding the new role of the system administrator as an unfamiliar in-
termediary in communications; the falling costs of communications in 
cyberspace may provide incentives for conduct currently possible but 
heretofore infeasible; new technologies may create opportunities for 
new kinds of behavior like anonymity; customs in this new medium 
may differ from existing customs or be unfamiliar when the inquiry 
turns to "reasonableness;" and so on. Given that there are some "new" 
legal problems in cyberspace for at least these reasons, how should the 
legal system respond? 
Commonly one thinks of legal rules responsive to the needs of new 
situations as being handed down by a higher authority, either courts or 
legislatures. One option, then, is for those affected by the new develop-
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ments of cyberspace to take matters to court and seek resolution under 
general common law principles and whatever existing statutes might 
arguably be applicable. Alternatively, they can press a legislative body 
such as the Congress or state legislatures to enact statutes that clarify 
rights and obligations. 
Rules guiding conduct, however, can arise in an astonishing vari-
ety of ways, many of them from individuals themselves quite apart 
from judicial or legislative pronouncements. For example, parties can 
form their own rules collectively; they can reach contractual agree-
ments on behavior toward each other as individuals; they can form 
groups and associations with charters and by-laws; they can set up 
commissions and panels of experts to devise model rules; they can get 
by without rules; etc. 
We have many historical and contemporary examples of what hap-
pens when a central authority does not promulgate rules: stores may 
hire private security guards; parties may agree on their own behavior 
vis-a-vis one another in the form of contracts; in international business 
transactions, parties often specify not only their behavior toward one 
another, but also under which set of laws they will resolve any disputes 
later arising; in relations between sovereign nations, there is no authori-
tative decision maker with the power to enforce decisions, yet a body of 
international law has nevertheless arisen over the centuries; countless 
private associations have formed their own rules of conduct by adopting 
by-laws. 
For that matter, a large part of our current cyberspace, the In-
ternet, is essentially ungoverned by any sort of "higher" authority. 
Other parts, the commercial service providers in cyberspace like Prod-
igy, Compuserve, and America OnLine, are largely governed by their 
corporate founders and managers, not by Congress or the judiciary. 
This section of the article will therefore examine a variety of non-
judicial and non-legislative approaches that have been used to regulate 
behavior in other contexts as a guide to the kind of regulatory mecha-
nisms that might be usefully applied in cyberspace. 
A. Unilateral Self-Help: Stay Away 
The lowest level of self-help is unilateral action by an individual. 
We might capture the sense of this measure with the phrase "if you 
don't like it, don't do it." Certainly at times this is the appropriate 
response of the legal system. We do not have a rule prohibiting paint 
stores from carrying unattractive colors of paint; we assume that if in-
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dividuals do not like certain colors, they will not buy them. The same 
will certainly be true of various activities in cyberspace. 
In general, unilateral activity avoidance by individuals is an appro-
priate response when the activity has no significant external effects, and 
the costs of reaching a contractual agreement with the activity are high 
relative to the value of such an agreement. The lack of external effects 
mean that unilateral action is truly unilateral--others will not be 
harmed or benefited so that the interests of others need not be taken 
into account. High transaction costs simply mean that a contract-based 
solution is not feasible. 
If the costs of transacting with the activity are relatively low, we 
move into the area of contracts-"bilateral self help"-as the next 
level "up" in the hierarchy of decentralized to centralized rule develop-
ment. Contracts offer a richer field of examples for the regulation of 
behavior than unilateral self help because contracts can be tailored to 
an enormous variety of circumstances and can specify complex rela-
tionships and duties. 
Contracts are sometimes thought to be a narrow form of behavior 
control; they seem to apply most comfortably to two parties and to ex-
hibit rapidly increasing transaction costs when more and more parties 
seek to become members of an agreement. In fact, transaction costs are 
only problematical when they are large with respect to the value of the 
contractual agreement. When such an agreement is highly valuable, it 
can be quite complex, involving many parties over a period of many 
years, even when transaction costs are high in an absolute sense. 
A particularly nice example of this comes from turn-of-the-century 
France, where contracts effectively substituted for a regime of intellec-
tual property protection.112 In the early years of this century, French 
plant growers began to realize the potential of deliberate breeding ex-
periments for commercially significant plant improvements. They 
sought from the government the enactment of a scheme of intellectual 
property protection for plant varieties. This request was turned down 
on the grounds that one cannot obtain such protection for products of 
nature. 
In response, the breeders formed elaborate associations and coop-
eratives, with multi-level contractual agreements, that provided for 
rights of ownership, including obligations to pay royalties, in experi-
52. This illustration is from Ejan Mackaay, Economic Incentives in Markets for Informa-
tion and Innovation, 13 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 867, 902-03 (1990). 
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mentally developed plant varieties. This contract-based scheme endured 
from about 1904 until 1970, when the French government enacted a 
legislative scheme of property rights in plant varieties that essentially 
followed the lines of the previous contractual agreements.53 
Other contractual arrangements may similarly work to regulate 
the behavior of individuals in a larger group, even when the motivation 
of a commercial endeavor is absent. For example, several people might 
want to start a cyberspace church, club, charitable foundation or other 
interest group. Would it be possible for such groups to form in cyber-
space? Of course-there is every reason to think that they will because 
we have ready examples of such agreements from the law and practice 
of private associations. Trade associations come most quickly to mind 
as an example of private associations because organizations that exist 
to further the commercial and educational needs of industry or profes-
sional groups are so common. Yet scientific, educational, religious, and 
charitable private associations exist as well.54 
There is no impediment to individuals forming an association 
under ordinary association law, perhaps incorporated as most such as-
sociations are, drawing up its own by-laws for behavior in cyberspace. 
One would expect that most such rules would relate to the activities of 
the group as they apply to "real" space; but there is no reason to think 
that an organization's by-laws could not also regulate members' con-
duct toward each other in cyberspace. Indeed, one can easily imagine 
groups forming whose sole contact and interaction and perhaps pur-
poses relate only to cyberspace. 
It is hornbook law that "[t]hose who join an incorporated trade or 
professional association agree, by such affiliation, to abide by the asso-
ciation's by-laws."55 An association, thus, has broad discretion to con-
trol its membership, an aspect of the freedom of association under the 
First Amendment, though with judicially enforced limitations in some 
areas such as anti-trust activity or violations of civil rights laws.58 Con-
53. !d. at 903. 
54. Indeed, although the oldest continuous association in the United States is a trade associ-
ation-the Philadelphia House Carpenters, begun in 1724-the second oldest is scientific-the 
American Philosophical Society, which began in 1743. JERALD A. JACOBS, AssociATION LAW 
HANDBOOK 12 (2d ed. 1986). 
55. GEORGE D. WEBSTER, THE LAW OF AssOCIATIONS § 2.03(1)(b) (1993). 
56. !d. at § 2.07(1)(a). For the antitrust discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 14-
17. 
1994] PROPER LEGAL REGIME 1019 
trol under an association's by-laws is normally enforced by means of 
expulsion or other by-laws-designated sanction.157 
Private association law does not exist in a vacuum, of course; some 
aspects of such associations are regulated under state corporate law. 
That implies that not all relevant legal issues for an association can be 
handled by the association's members themselves. 
For example, many state association statutes specify the need for 
"annual meetings" to be held either in the state of incorporation or 
elsewhere.158 Obviously such statutes were written with physical meet-
ings in mind; would it be acceptable under associational law for the 
group to hold a virtual meeting in cyberspace? Typical meeting tasks 
include voting on officers; there would have to be devised a form of 
reliable cyberspace voting procedure, as well as an assessment of the 
presence of a quorum. 
With regard to such voting, one envisions all manner of fraudulent 
activities possible: phantom "virtual" members casting votes when cor-
responding real members are sick, "absent," or unaware of the meet-
ing. Yet the authentication issues here are not significantly different 
from authentication in cyberspace generally; presumably, whatever 
techniques arise to verify contract offers, exchanges of promissory notes 
and court document will also work to establish the identity of associa-
tion members. The point is simply that there is a clear mechanism for 
parties with strongly held common interests to self regulate through 
private associations. 
B. Law Merchant 
It is also possible that many cyberspace users will interact with 
each other outside of any previously negotiated contracts and outside of 
any on-going groups operating under association or corporate law. 
What rules, in the absence of a statute, might grow up to govern the 
relations among those who deal with each other on a frequent basis, 
but do not have prior contracts, by-laws, or other agreements? We 
should expect that such situations are fertile ground for the develop-
ment of customs, customs that might even evolve to the point of becom-
ing judicially recognized and hence legally binding. 
Why expect the development of customs? We have an historical 
parallel to cyberspace, one in which customs grew from the "bottom 
57. Id. at § 2.07(2)(d). 
58. Id. at § 2.07(3). 
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up" and achieved the status of legal enforceability, in the Medieval 
"Law Merchant." The Law Merchant was a body of customary 
rules-the precursor to contemporary commercial law-that grew up 
in Medieval Europe as a response to the needs of international com-
merce. We commonly think of the modern world as especially "global" 
in its commerce; but it is instructive to note that even in the Fourteenth 
Century, travelers and traders covered much of the European continent 
and England. 59 
The locus of much of the Medieval trade activity was the "trade 
fair." Trade fairs were periodic gatherings of merchants at central lo-
cations in Europe and England, where goods of all sorts were bought 
and sold for shipment or transport back to the merchant's home terri-
tory. These trade fairs featured merchants from Asia as well as Eu-
rope, and gave rise to a number of commercial instrument such as bills 
of exchange and bills of lading. 
What exactly was the ~'Law Merchant?" It was simply an enforce-
able set of customary practices that inured to the benefit of merchants, 
and that was reasonably uniform across all the jurisdictions involved in 
the trade fairs.60 Two key elements of the Law Merchant for our pur-
poses were first, that no statute or other authoritative pronouncement 
of law gave rise to its existence, and second, that the Law Merchant 
existed in some sense apart from and in addition to the ordinary rules 
of law that applied to non-merchant transactions. 
In other words, the Law Merchant made no attempt to displace 
existing rules promulgated by the jurisdiction in which a given trade 
fair might be held; it merely supplemented those rules with specific 
rules applicable to merchants' transactions.61 Special courts grew up to 
enforce the Law Merchant. These were merchant courts in every sense: 
59. See BARBARA W. TUCHMAN. A DISTANT MIRROR 55-57 (1978). 
60. The LAw MERCHANT was envisioned as 
... a system of law that [did] ... not rest exclusively on the institutions and local cus-
toms of any particular country, but consisted of certain principles of equity and usages of 
trade which general convenience and a common sense of justice have established to regu-
late the dealings of merchants and mariners in all the commercial countries of the civilized 
world. 
LEON E. TRAKMAN. THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 11-12 (1983) 
(quoting Bank of Conway v. Stary, 200 N.W. 505, 508 (N.D. 1924) (Johnson, J.)). 
61. See WYNDHAM A. BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW MERCHANT 15-25 (1923); 1 
WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 543 (The Law Merchant "was a law 
which necessarily differed at many points from the ordinary law, for 'no technical jurisprudence 
peculiar to any country would have been satisfactory to traders coming from many different coun-
tries.'") (quoting JOHN WILLIAM SMITH, MERCANTILE LAW 1xx (ed. 1890). 
1994] PROPER LEGAL REGIME 1021 
their jurisdiction was that of commercial transactions, and their judges 
were drawn from the ranks of the merchant class itself on the basis of 
experience and seniority.62 
The emphasis of these merchant courts and the law they applied 
was a speedy resolution of disputes, an important element when time is 
money. But another significant attribute of these courts was practical-
ity and flexibility. Merchant practices were not static, and a reliance on 
local judges, taken from the merchants' own ranks and following the 
known customs of merchants, gave the Law Merchant an adaptability 
to changing times that statutory enactments would not have provided.63 
The Law Merchant courts eventually declined in use, but the rules 
of the law merchant continued to be applied by common law courts 
after the close of the sixteenth century.64 Here, in short, was a custom 
that over time acquired powerful legal force without the backing of the 
sovereign. 
The parallels with cyberspace are strong. Many people interact 
frequently over networks, but not always with the same people each 
time so that advance contractual relations are not always practical. 
Commercial transactions will more and more take place in cyberspace, 
and more and more those transactions will cross national boundaries 
and implicate different bodies of law. Speedy resolution of disputes will 
be as desirable as it was in the Middle Ages! The means of an informal 
court system are in place in the form of on-line discussion groups and 
electronic mail. A "Law Cyberspace" co-existing with existing laws 
would be an eminently practical and efficient way of handling com-
merce in the networked world. 
62. See also TRAKMAN; supra note 60, at 15. Holdsworth noted that "Though the court [of 
piepowder, the merchant court at a fair] was held by the mayor, bailiffs, or steward, the judges of 
the court, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, were the merchants who attended the fair." 
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 61, at 536. 
63. 
The strict law prevailing within the ordinary courts of the realm, generally being unable to 
adjust to changing commercial custom with the same ease as could a commercial system, 
played only a minimal role in the development of the Medieval Law Merchant. Strict rules 
lacked the flexibility to vary in response to the peculiarities of the merchants, to their trade 
background and to their form of bargaining. 
TRAKMAN, supra note 60, at 16. 
There was evidently a fair amount of local variation (and some local prejudice) in the 
merchants' rules, however-perhaps an inevitable by-product of decentralized rule-making. See 
id. at 17-20. 
64. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 61, at 569. 
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C. Custom in Public International Law 
Reliance on custom alone as a regulator of behavior may strike 
some readers as ineffective, notwithstanding the historical evidence of 
the Law Merchant. But we have contemporary examples of "customary 
law" as well that exemplify the practice of such a regime. 
Many lawyers would be surprised to learn that an enormous 
amount of law governs transactions between nations, provides the rule 
of decision in disputes, and affects the willingness of nations to enter 
into treaties and, yet none of this law has ever been "enacted" or other-
wise created by a sovereign. This is public international law. The 
sources of international law include treaty, custom, and "general prin-
ciples of law."65 Of these three sources, treaties are much like contracts 
between nation states, with obvious parallels to contracts formed be-
tween individuals. A discussion of contracts was made earlier and will 
not be revisited here. 
"General principles" of law is a concept based on observations that 
many nations' legal systems contain fundamental provisions that are 
widely similar to those of other nations. When these common provisions 
are frequently observed as binding within each nation, they form the 
basis of a kind of "law" that will be recognized implicitly as legally 
binding when nations deal with one another.66 Since cyberspace is not a 
recognized legal jurisdiction with an existing sovereign and cannot deal 
as a nation with other nations, however, this aspect of public interna-
tional law is also not relevant to our inquiry. It is rather the third 
source, "customary international law," that I want to focus on here. 
Some international law scholars argue that adherence to custom 
can never gain the force of law, basing this view on the jurisprudential 
principle that "law" is the command of a sovereign.67 Yet there are 
quite clearly times when nations themselves show a willingness to abide 
by an international custom, and a willingness to be bound by the deci-
sions of international courts.68 This willingness is not contradicted by 
65. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 
Bevans 1153; see a/so MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-6, 10 
(1988). 
66. JANIS, supra note 65, at 54-58. 
67. Generally this line of thinking follows philosopher John Austin's views that the only true 
"law" is "positive law," that is, law enacted by a sovereign. See id. at 2-3 (JOHN AusTIN, THE 
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 208 (1st ed. 1832)). 
68. Nations do in fact follow international law most of the time. LOUIS HENKIN, How NA-
TIONS BEHAVE-LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979). 
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the fact that in international jurisprudence it is common for there to be 
no clear ranking of authoritativeness in court decisions.69 
Despite the lack of a "world authority," custom in international 
law has a long history. Roman law recognized it with the notion that 
"long-continued custom approved by the consent of those who use it 
imitates a statute."70 The United States Supreme Court officially rec-
ognized it as enforceable in U.S. domestic courts in 1900, in The Pa-
quete Habana case.71 In The Paquete Habana, Cuban fishing vessels 
had set out to sea, their proprietors not knowing that war had broken 
out between the U.S. and Spain, then colonial owner of Cuba. United 
States warships seized the Cuban fishing vessels as prizes of war, but 
the Supreme Court declared that "[b]y an ancient usage among civi-
lized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a 
rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation 
of catching and bringing in fresh fish, have been recognized as exempt, 
with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war."72 
Note that under the facts of The Paquete Habana the U.S. was 
not a party to any treaty or other documented requirement to release 
the vessels; the Court's decision was based solidly on long-standing cus-
tom, and nothing more. Thus, custom alone can give rise to an enforce-
able legal requirement; but how does one know when a custom has 
reached the exalted state of legal enforceability? In international law, a 
custom becomes enforceable when it has become more or less histori-
cally uniform, and when nations follow the custom as much from a 
sense of legal obligation as from habit or convenience.73 This is not 
exactly a well-defined circumstance; indeed, it is a bit circular: a cus-
tom will be legally enforceable when nations follow it from a sense of 
legal obligation. How does one know that nations feel a sense of legal 
obligation? At least in part, the answer is that a court will treat the 
custom as legally enforceable! 
Nonetheless a few guidelines exist to help in the determination of 
the sense of moral obligation. One indication comes from non-enforcea-
ble agreements in international fora such as the United Nations. Mem-
ber nations vote on resolutions and hence indicate their views on the 
69. JANIS, supra note 65, at 6. 
70. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN. THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 45 (bk. I, tit. II,§ 9) 
(Lee ed., 4th ed. R.W. Lee, 1956), quoted in JANIS, supra note 65, at 35. 
71. 175 u.s. 677, 708-09 (1900). 
72. Id. at 686. 
73. See JANIS, supra note 65, at 39-40. 
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issue at hand. Such resolutions are not directly legally binding, but 
they may form evidence of a nation's sense of moral obligation, which 
in turn is evidence that a custom has become, if not exactly legally 
binding, then "quasi-binding" as a kind of "soft" customary interna-
tional law. These in turn may gradually acquire the status of "hard" 
law and become actually binding.74 
Another earmark of enforceable custom of greater relevance to a 
"law of cyberspace," however, is the writings of scholars. "Much of the 
work of discerning and developing customary international law is done 
... by scholars in researching and writing legal doctrine."715 An espe-
cially strong form of evidence of custom is the publication, whether by 
an individual scholar or a nation's government, of a digest of customary 
international practice.76 Closely related to reliance on scholarly writ-
ings to ascertain international customs is a reliance on model codes and 
recommendations by various international bodies. Resolutions of the 
United Nations and reports from the U.N.'s International Law Com-
mission can be influential in court decisions.77 
A reliance on customary law has its drawbacks, of course, includ-
ing the potential for nations' to disagree on what a "custom" is, how it 
applies to a given factual circumstance, and the problem of strategic 
behavior-a nation behaving in a certain way precisely for the purpose 
of trying to "create" a custom.78 But the remarkable thing for our pur-
poses is that despite these complications, and the murkiness of the phil-
osophical question of what is "law," the basic principle remains that 
practices developed by parties themselves can eventually rise to the 
level of enforceable, that is, judicially recognizable, rules of behavior 
without ever being codified by a legislative body. 
These contemporary international practices, like the Medieval 
Law Merchant, have obvious relevance to a developing law of cyber-
space. First, they have direct relevance in that more and more interna-
tional dealings will take place over computer networks; presumably ex-
isting international rules and customs will apply to these dealings 
whenever appropriate. Second, unique customs will certainly develop in 
cyberspace. The history of international customary law suggests that 
74. Id. at 43-44 (citing Bernhardt, Customary International Law, 7 ENCY. Pus. INTL. L. 61, 
62 (1984) and Seidl-Hohenveldern, International Economic 'Soft Law,' 163 HAGUE RECUEIL 165, 
194-213 (1979)). 
75. JANIS, supra note 65, at 48. 
76. Id. at 42-43. 
77. Id. at 43-45. 
78. Id. at 46. 
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when sufficiently developed and widely adhered to, these customs will 
acquire the force of law, even in the absence of positive enactment by a 
sovereign. 
IV. WHAT TYPES OF RULES WORK BEST? 
Part II identified an illustrative list of cyberspace legal issues that 
merit further attention, and tried to understand why these issues and 
not others raise new questions. Part III discussed a number of ways in 
which rules for regulating behavior can arise, many of them from the 
"bottom up" by the affected individuals themselves rather than being 
issued "top down" by a court or legislature. Part IV will address the 
question of which of the ways for regulating behavior in cyberspace are 
most appropriately relied on for a number of the problem areas already 
identified. Clearly when there is a sovereign with authority, a statute 
can address almost any problem. Yet statutes are not always neces-
sary-there are occasions when "live and let live" is a useful rule. How 
do we determine when a "top down" rule such as a statute is best, and 
when a "bottom up" rule such as private contract or no rule at all, is 
best? 
The key to answering this question is the recognition that the tech-
nology of computer communications is rapidly changing. The number 
of people using cyberspace, and the number and variety of services be-
ing offered on-line, are both growing with astonishing rapidity. In the 
face of this very dynamic situation, we ought to be reluctant to impose 
behavior control that is inflexible and uniform beyond the needs of the 
situation. As a general matter, the most flexible rules are those that are 
issued at the "lowest" possible level: bottom up rules like those embod-
ied in contracts or the rule of "live and let live" can be changed more 
easily by their makers than statutes or judicial precedents. 
One factor that suggests the avoidance of self-help or contractual 
solutions is the existence of externalities. When unilateral or bilateral 
measures significantly harm third parties, the justification for top-down 
rules such as statutes to minimize harmful effects is strong. Yet even 
here one should be cautious in turning to centralized rule-making, for 
rapidly changing technology is likely to change the notion of what is or 
is not an "externality" in a given transaction. For example, a number 
of organizations have felt at liberty to subscribe to a single newsletter, 
which they then reproduce for individual members of the organiza-
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tion.79 Whatever effect this reproduction has on the newsletter's copy-
right holder is an externality with regard to that holder. But this exter-
nality is only a function of the fact that currently it is desirable to 
circulate newsletters in paper form. Suppose a future technology makes 
access through an on-line BBS both the cheapest and most desirable 
method of access? Suppose further that on-line access can technically 
be arranged so that downloading or copying from the computer's screen 
is not possible. Then we would have a situation in which the advantages 
of paper reproduction had diminished and the replacement technology 
would not be accompanied by harmful externalities. 
All the foregoing observations in turn lead to a clear policy that 
when a "new" problem is identified in cyberspace, we should initially 
respond with the lowest, most decentralized level of control possible. 
After all, a problem that can be worked out satisfactorily between two 
people neither requires nor benefits from the adoption of a federal stat-
ute, let alone a multi-lateral international treaty. It makes sense, there-
fore, to start with the presumption that the lowest level of resolution 
can solve control problems, working "upward" in control mechanisms 
from there as necessary. 
This section therefore begins with pure self-help remedies, which 
are appropriate for a limited class of problems. The remainder of the 
section discusses contractual approaches to behavior regulation, which 
can work well in quite a variety of cyberspace circumstances. After a 
review of contractual solutions, the appropriateness of cyberspace cus-
toms as a regulatory mechanism will be addressed. Finally, this section 
will analyze some specific problem areas not already addressed in the 
previous discussion. 
A. Pure Self-Help 
The most modest response to a new problem in cyberspace is for 
the legal system to do nothing whatever. In some situations, that re-
sponse will prove perfectly fine as a regulatory mechanism. Situations 
appropriate for self-help are characterized by a lack of externalities, 
and the presence of a wide range of choices for the "consumer" of 
cyberspace services. 
For example, cyberspace users often participate in discussion 
79. See Television Digest Inc. v. United States Tel. Ass'n, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1697; 21 
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2211 (D.D.C. 1993); Pasha Publications, Inc. v. Enmark Gas Corp., 22 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1076; Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 26,881; 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2062 
(N.D. Tex. 1992). 
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groups called "listservs" or "newsgroups." These groups occasionally 
feature acrimonious commentary that some recipients will find offen-
sive. An obvious solution for those who are offended is to exercise self-
help by withdrawing from participation in the discussion group and 
finding or starting another group. There are probably thousands of ex-
isting groups that may be joined, and the requirements for starting a 
discussion group on many networks, both the Internet and the private 
desktop networks, are modest and low in cost. This "solution" is, of 
course, the preferred one under First Amendment law generally as it 
avoids government intervention into the exercise of free speech rights; it 
is not suggested that the cyberspace problem is different-merely that 
for the legal system to "do nothing" is sometimes the best solution in 
both real and cyberspace. 
For another example, advertisements on the current Internet COI}l-
puter network are not common because of that network's not-for-profit 
origins.80 Today, when someone does put out an e-mail message on the 
Internet that is an advertisement, it is often greeted with vigorous ob-
jections by others and assertions that the objectors will avoid the adver-
tised products assiduously.81 This is unilateral self help at its best. 
The issue of pornography is similar but a bit more complicated.82 
At first blush, many users of cyberspace would no doubt make the 
same claim about pornographic materials as is made about abrasive 
debate: do not look at what you do not want to be exposed to; supervise 
your children so they do not look; pornography is just a matter of con-
tract if you want it (willing buyers and willing sellers abound in this 
market), and unilateral self-help if you do not. 
The difficulty in identifying self-help as the appropriate level of 
remedy here is that there is wide-spread disagreement over whether 
pornography is really just a contract matter without externalities or 
whether it has significant externalities. The latter view holds that por-
80. Advertising on the Internet may soon become a problem. After this article was com-
pleted, the author learned of a controversial advertising message over the Internet from a law firm 
indirectly seeking clients with questions about immigration law. The controversy centered on the 
fact that the message apparently went literally to millions of Internet users. It seems likely that 
this use of the network as a mass medium for advertising will increase in the future. 
81. See John Burgess, On The Internet, Frontier Justice, WASH. PosT, Feb. 28, 1994, Bus. 
Sec. Supp., at 19, 25. 
82. To the extent that one believes acrimonious debate to have externalities, of the sort that 
"hate speech" codes are designed to prevent, then that situation becomes similar to that of por-
nography and equally intractable. 
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nography affects the moral tenor and perhaps even the physical safety 
of the entire community, particularly women.83 
For those who believe that pornography has no significant exter-
nalities, self-help is clearly the preferred solution as it is the least intru-
sive and most flexible (one can change one's mind about it). For those 
who believe that pornography has significant externalities, the external-
ities are usually thought to affect large groups ("women," the "commu-
nity," etc.). With wide-ranging and pervasive externalities, self-help 
remedies are inappropriate, leaving a statutory response as likely to be 
the only effective remedy. 
The matter of pornography's external effects is thus highly depen-
dent on one's personal views and is not amenable to solution here. Per-
haps the best that can be hoped for in this context is that courts han-
dling prosecutions under anti-obscenity laws will have some sense that 
a cyberspace "community" may be quite different from a real space 
community with which it intersects. System administrators can perform 
a limited amount of self-help in this context by clearly identifying their 
materials and taking steps to screen out minors from access. It might 
make sense for the cyberspace community (or communities) to set stan-
dards for itself in the form of customs as discussed more fully below.84 
Self classification of BBSs not unlike that of motion pictures (X, R, G, 
etc.) might help suggest that such communities are well established 
and worthy of judicial recognition. 
B. Contract Approaches 
Simply withdrawing from participation in a cyberspace activity is 
not always the best solution, of course. It may be that all affected par-
ties would be better off if, rather than never dealing again with one 
another, they instead reached agreement about limits and obligations 
on their own behavior with respect to one another. They can make their 
transactions better, in other words, by forming contracts, which is a 
step up from pure self-help in the scale of remedies from most decen-
tralized to most centralized. 
In the case of acrimonious debate, for example, if the discussion is 
held on a private BBS in cyberspace, the system administrator can 
gauge the relative desirability of censoring discussions and offer con-
83. For an objective discussion of externalities of pornography, see RICHARD A. POSNER. 
SEX AND REASON 366-74 (1992). 
84. See infra text accompanying notes 106-20. 
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tractual commitments to censor or not, as seems most desirable to most 
participants. Naturally, some systems would feature a great deal of 
such control, and others none at all. That is a good outcome because it 
allows people with different thresholds of tolerance for acrimony to 
seek out the system that matches that threshold. 
Can we identify in general the situations in cyberspace for which 
contracts are an appropriate response? We know that parties who deal 
with each other in regard to transactions that have high value to the 
participants, relative to the costs of the transaction, can be expected to 
form their own contracts. The Coase theorem,85 moreover, tells us that 
in such circumstances, the parties will reach an economically efficient 
result. In the absence of some compelling contrary social policy or sig-
nificant detrimental effects to parties external to the contract, then, 
there is good reason to allow parties in cyberspace to form their own 
contracts to their own mutual agreement. 
We have seen that a great many of the new problems of cyber-
space revolve around the role of the system administrator. The presence 
of a system administrator as a service intermediary also means in most 
cases that a user of the system administrator's BBS must gain some 
sort of entry "permission" in the form of an account for or subscription 
to the BBS. This entry point situation suggests the presence of low 
transaction costs because the parties must already enter a transaction 
of some sort for the user to gain access to the BBS. In addition to low 
transaction costs, we have the wide variability among BBSs and the 
range of system administrator roles, from active to inactive, in the flow 
of messages through their systems suggesting that a uniform statutory 
approach to control will be far less than optimal. Under these facts the 
appropriate rights and duties should be defined in the most decentral-
ized way, again arguing for a contracts approach. 
Contracts between users and system administrators also appear, at 
least with a first-cut analysis, to have few if any external effects. There 
is no pollution of surrounding users' property from the use of a BBS; no 
increase in accident costs to others; no (presently known) danger to the 
public's health generally; and so on. We should therefore start with a 
presumption that contracts will arise to resolve whatever conflicts and 
disputes may occur in regard to the use of BBS services. 
In fact, contracts already form the bedrock control mechanism 
with privately supplied BBS services. For example, access to Prodigy, 
85. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. I (1960). 
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Compuserve, America OnLine, the Well, Genie, Lexis Counsel Con-
nect, as well as the countless small desktop BBSs run by hobbyists, is 
already subject to contractual agreements. Users must go through some 
form of initial "sign-on" procedure, whether on-line or by a paper 
transaction, by which they identify themselves, agree to make pay-
ments (for those BBSs that charge an access fee), agree to abide by 
whatever rules the system administrator imposes, and so on. At that 
point of entry the controlling system administrator can require adher-
ence to a contract that specifies "legal" and "illegal" behavior. 
Universities, most of which are connected to the Internet, could 
incorporate such rules in any faculty employment contract. Typically, 
such a set of rules would be included in a "faculty handbook," which 
would list a variety of university policies and requirements and could 
therefore readily incorporate guidelines and policies for use of the In-
ternet or other networks. Students similarly agree to abide by certain 
university rules, which could easily include rules regarding appropriate 
cyberspace behavior.86 
Let us take an example of something that is commonplace in 
cyberspace and see whether a contractual solution could be used for its 
resolution. A very typical cyberspace service is electronic mail. Besides 
reading and writing e-mail, many BBS users also rely on the ease of 
copying already-digitized messages to forward copies of such messages 
to others who might find them of interest. 
Written messages, even if electronic, are copyrighted.87 Users who 
forward others' messages are, in short, reproducing and distributing 
copyrighted material in violation of the copyright laws. One could ar-
gue that the copyright statute should be changed to accommodate this 
practice, but that is a very centralized and drastic solution. After all, 
some individuals may prefer not to have their electronic writing fall 
outside the scope of copyright protection; a statute would sweep them 
together with those who preferred otherwise. 
The contract solution, in contrast, can work here; it already does 
on at least one commercial BBS, the Lexis Counsel Connect service 
which is a large BBS service for lawyers. Subscribers to this service 
sign an initial contract whereby they grant the right of reproduction of 
86. My university has few rules, but certain behavior relating to unauthorized access is 
prohibited, as well as certain game playing activities. 
87. Any work of authorship is copyrighted as soon as it is fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). 
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their messages to others.88 By clarifying copyright issues ahead of time, 
the contract resolves the tension between frequent practice and copy-
right law. 
This contractual outcome in effect reverses the presumption of the 
copyright statute, but without the global effects of a statutory reversal. 
Moreover, users who object to this regime can exercise unilateral self-
help by choosing not to become Counsel Connect subscribers, by argu-
ing with the management to change the rule, or by setting up a com-
peting service with the opposite presumption. In short, the contract so-
lution here is decentralized because it applies only to Lexis Counsel 
Connect and its subscribers, and that seems appropriate. 
The problems become more complicated when we consider that 
messages originally left on one BBS may be copied and distributed to 
other BBSs. What if other BBSs have different contractual presump-
tions? On closer inspection, the problem is no different from the single-
BBS example, for if users of one BBS copy messages onto another BBS 
then they can also be governed by the first BBSs contracts. Such a 
contract might state, for example, that users consent to waive copyright 
in their messages, or perhaps waive it to the extent of noncommercial 
reproduction,89 whether on the BBS in question or other services. This 
again would resolve issues of broader message distribution without need 
of statutes or other relatively more inflexible rules. 
It would even be possible, with the low cost of communications in 
cyberspace, for a large number of system administrators to create a set 
of "by-laws" that would guide system administrator behavior. Recall 
that by-laws may be viewed as a contract among the members of a 
private association, a contract designed to outlast any particular trans-
action between any particular set of parties. Here such a contract 
would be a way to "codify" custom. If a substantial number of system 
administrators around the world reached agreement on basic customs 
88. The contract specifies that: 
members who submit material shall be deemed to (i) grant to [Counsel Connect] and sub-
scribers to the system a paid up, perpetual, world-wide irrevocable license to use, copy and 
redistribute such materials and any portions thereof and any derivative works therefrom 
and (ii) warrant that such submitting member has all rights necessary to submit such ma-
terial and that the use of such material by [Counsel Connect] and subscribers to the sys-
tem wiJJ not infringe any other party's rights. 
Counsel Connect Contract: Counsel Connect Rules § II (Aug. 1993) (copy on file with the Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Law Review). 
89. With the "noncommercial" limitation there would naturally arise occasional disputes 
over what was "noncommercial," but these are the sorts of disputes that always occur at the 
margin of any rule. 
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and practices in cyberspace, they could provide an effective discipline 
for users and other system administrators who violated the by-laws by 
expelling them from participation in affiliated BBSs. Courts would have 
good reason to defer to the result as long as the by-laws dealt only with 
the behavior of the contracting users and system administrators. Such a 
set of cyberspace "by-laws" might achieve the effectiveness of an inter-
national treaty without the official participation of the nation-states 
where the various systems reside. 
C. Privacy in the Corporate Setting 
Let us now examine the question of an employer reading an em-
ployees' e-mail. It is apparent that the parties in question, employees 
and employers, are already in a contractual relationship, so that the 
additional transaction cost of bargaining over e-mail privacy will be 
quite low. There is also likely to be wide variation in the desires of 
different employers and employees for privacy. Employers in industries 
with serious risks of employee theft of trade secrets, for example, might 
put a high value on being able to monitor their employees' e-mail. 
Other employers may experience little or no threats to corporate well-
being through their employees' e-mail and might have correspondingly 
little or no interest in monitoring. From the employees' perspective, the 
same variation will occur. Employees in some industries may value 
highly the certainty that their messages are not monitored; in other 
industries, the employees may be indifferent to this possibility. 
At this writing, legislation has been introduced in Congress to ad-
dress e-mail privacy in the work place by a uniform statute.90 At least 
one commentator has also expressed the argument that employees 
ought to be granted a uniform right of privacy in their communica-
tions.91 There are possibilities that state wiretap laws or state constitu-
tional provisions about privacy may yet be held applicable to workplace 
privacy.92 In Canada, government officials have issued calls for legisla-
tion protecting privacy.93 There is no shortage, in other words, of pro-
90. S. 984, supra note 39; H.R. 1900, supra note 39. 
91. See Steven Winters, Comment, The New Privacy Interest: Electronic Mail in the 
Workplace, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 197 (1993). 
92. See id.; see also Julia Turner Baumhart, The Employer's Right to Read Employee E-
Mail: Protecting Property or Personal Prying?, 8 THE LAB. LAW. 923, 943-47 (1992). 
93. The Commissioner of the Ontario, Canada Information and Privacy Commission has 
recently called for the adoption of privacy "principles" for electronic mail. See ToM WRIGHT. 
COMMISSIONER. PRIVACY PROTECTION PRINCIPLES FOR ELECTRONIC MAIL SYSTEMS (1994) (on 
file with the University of Pittsburgh Law Review). 
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posals and possibilities for something other than a contract solution to 
workplace e-mail privacy. 
Nevertheless, the low transaction costs that follow from the ex-
isting contractual relationship and the wide variation in desires for pri-
vacy by both employers and employees in the employment setting-. not 
to say the rapid technological changes that make it hard to know what 
"e-mail in the workplace" will look like in only a few years' 
time-show that a uniform statutory response for all industries is very 
much inappropriate here. To the contrary, the situation has all the 
hallmarks of one that is suitable for the flexibility of contractual resolu-
tion.94 Such a resolution would likely take the form of a corporate pol-
icy about e-mail, delivered to all employees. Guidelines for just such 
policies are already readily available,9~ suggesting that the contract ap-
proach is in fact being implemented. 
D. Transaction Costs 
We have seen how contracts often meet the test of an appropriate 
behavior control in cyberspace, but they will not always do so with 
equal ease. They will prove less practical, in the most general sense, 
when contract transaction costs are great relative to the value of the 
agreement desired, or there are serious externalities to the contracting 
parties. For example, the more people who are affected by a cyberspace 
problem, the harder it will be for them to come to agreement, making 
some form of non-contractual arrangement, such as a statute, more 
appropriate. 
We have been looking at contractual relationships between a sys-
tem administrator and a BBS's users. Contracts made as a requirement 
of "entry" are appropriate for a number of behavior controls. It is pos-
sible for an authorized subscriber of a BBS to do more than just access 
that one BBS. In the world of universities connected to the Internet 
communications network, it is possible for a user to access a first BBS, 
say a student's own university computer, as a base for an attempt to 
make an unauthorized access to another BBS, typically at another 
university. 
94. Readers who think that "unequal bargaining strength" is a significant factor in the 
analysis of contract relationships may disagree with this conclusion. 
95. See DAVID R. JOHNSON & JOHN PODESTA. ACCESS TO AND UsE AND DISCLOSURE OF 
ELECTRONIC MAIL ON COMPANY COMPUTER SYSTEMS: A TOOLKIT FOR FORMULATING YOUR 
COMPANY's PoLICY (1991). This booklet is published by the Electronic Mail Association, 1655 N. 
Fort Myer Drive, Suite 850, Arlington, VA 22209. 
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Here we have an example of a contract "externality" in cyber-
space: the parties to the contract, the home university and the student, 
may reach agreement on terms, but the non-contracting university or 
BBS is affected by the access attempts. Even if the original university's 
contract with the student specifies that such attempted access is forbid-
den, the contracting university has little incentive to pursue disciplinary 
measures against the student who violates the agreement because it is 
another university that suffers the harm. 
This is not idle speculation; in one instance of which the author is 
aware,96 a university experienced attempts by someone to gain access to 
the university's computing facilities. The individual in question was not 
local to the university, but was evidently a student obtaining access 
from another university. When the university that experienced the at-
tempted access approached the other university about the possibility of 
their controlling the student's conduct, the other university was unin-
terested: no harm had been done, and no attempt had been made to 
break into that university's facilities, and that was that. 
A similar problem of apparent externalities occurs when BBSs 
serve as temporary repositories of electronic mail. A great deal of mail, 
whether over the Internet or the loose confederations of desktop BBS 
systems known as "FidoNet" and other networks, travels through a 
great many "host" systems which hold the mail for a time, then for-
ward it to another such system. In FidoNet, for example, most of the 
mail is carried at night when long distance telephone rates are lower. A 
given message may therefore take several days to travel from originator 
to sender, and in that time may pass through dozens of separate BBSs. 
Is there any requirement that a BBS properly forward the mail 
that is routed to it? Here we are dealing with a cyberspace service, 
electronic mail, that is at a different level from the previous user-to-
BBS example. Instead, we are dealing with a set of BBSs that must 
cooperate in order to provide wide routing of users' mail from the 
whole collection of BBSs. 
The lowest level solution for both attempted break-ins from remote 
sites and for the forwarding of mail is still contract, but it would re-
quire a substantial number of contracting parties. With the FidoNet 
network of desktop BBSs, for example, each desktop BBS that wants to 
96. I have discussed the matter with a member of the affected university's computer center 
but chose not to disclose the university's name, other than to say that the event did not happen at 
my own university. No doubt countless other incidents like this take place every day; this is simply 
one incident about which I have direct information. 
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join the network must make an application and agree to certain terms. 
When any university wants to join the Internet, it also makes arrange-
ments with other parties, though the Internet is far more decentralized 
than even the desktop BBS networks. This "point of entry" would 
therefore be the logical place to find agreements about obligations with 
regard to mail, remote break-ins and the like. 
In fact, after writing the description of the user attempting a re-
mote break-in and the issue of forwarding mail on FidoNet, and deter-
mining that a contract solution was still a possibility, this author set 
out to determine whether such a solution had been attempted for either 
the Internet or FidoNet.97 With FidoNet, for example, probably the 
oldest such network of desktop BBSs, the founders of the network have 
developed a "policy" statement that is essentially the by-laws of a pri-
vate association.98 A hierarchy of services is specified, with managers at 
various levels in the hierarchy being assigned the power to discipline 
system administrators who fail to comply with the policy. Among the 
policies is a series of specifications about forwarding mail and what the 
system administrator should do when mail cannot be forwarded 
through the network.99 As might be expected, the ultimate sanction for 
failure to comply with the policy is exclusion from the network.100 
In addition, although universities on the Internet have a much less 
formal set of policies than FidoNet, there does nonetheless exist a kind 
of summary of customary practice on the network.101 Little is said in 
this summary about the requirement of forwarding mail, but there are 
definite requirements for network managers to read their mail and be 
available to others to help diagnose network problems and to take ac-
tion on security problems. There is even a provision addressing the 
problem of remote access: "it is important for managers to be willing to 
accept and act on other sites' security issues, warning or denying ac-
97. I really did do things in the sequence described: I first wrote a description of the prob-
lem, then looked to see if a contractual solution had been tried. 
98. The most recent copy available to me is FidoNet POLICY4 (June 8, 1989) (on file 
with the University of Pittsburgh Law Review). 
99. See generally id. at §§ 2 and 4.2. 
100. Id. (prescribing expulsion from the net as one sanction for "excessively annoying be· 
havior," and describing expulsion as "excommunication."). See also id. at§ 2.1.12 (defining "ex· 
communication");§ 1.3.5 (defining "excessively annoying), §§ 4.3, 5.2 (authorizing various levels 
of the net's hierarchy to discipline others); and § 9 (defining grievance procedures and discipli· 
nary action). 
101. See Memorandum from J. Van Bokkelen, Responsibilities of Host and Network Man-
agers: A Summary of the "Oral Tradition" of the Internet (Aug. 1990) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh Law Review). 
1036 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:993 
cess to offending users."102 Host systems are even advised not to have 
"open access" accounts because with such accounts, it is impossible to 
deny access to an offending user.103 
Two observations can be made here. One is that despite the pres-
ence of many parties and apparently high transaction costs, contract 
solutions or at least contract mitigations of problems may yet be feasi-
ble. If a large enough group can cooperate, then otherwise external 
problems become once again internalized. Second, it seems clear that 
really large networks of contracting users may find it hard to monitor 
the users as closely for enforcement purposes as they might desire. The 
sole available sanction of denial of access to the network104 may not be 
serious enough to curtail all the problems that one would wish to con-
trol. Some network sites might refuse to abide by the rules, particularly 
if they do not themselves have facilities that appear to offer interesting 
files or accounts to be "hacked" undetected. In addition, the willingness 
of different network sites to monitor and punish the prohibited conduct 
according to the by-laws may be substantially unequal. 
Thus, these problems seem on the margin of requiring more than 
contractual agreements. It is not surprising, therefore, that statutes ex-
ist that attempt to control at least the worst of these problems, the 
unauthorized access attempts.105 
E. Custom 
Like a reliance on contracts for control of cyberspace behavior, a 
reliance on custom works well in some circumstances, less well in 
others. We must address two basic issues with regard to custom in 
cyberspace: how does a court know when a custom is well-established; 
and what are the circumstances that prompt a court to follow (or ig-
nore) a concededly well-established custom. 
On the matter of establishing a custom, expert testimony will of 
102. !d. at 4. 
103. !d. at 4-5. 
104. The Internet summary of practices specifies that the "solution of last resort [is] ostra-
cism of the offending net." !d. at 4. 
105. Some of the problems of intercepting e-mail specificaily are dealt with in the federal 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ECPA]. At least 48 states have some sort of law 
about "computer crime," including prohibitions on "unauthorized access to a computer, computer 
trespass, computer tampering, computer hacking, unauthorized use of a computer, and alteration 
or damage to computer data or software." RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECH· 
NOLOGY ~ 12.04 (2d ed. 1992) (footnotes omitted). 
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course be relevant. But the example of public international law shows 
that codifications of practices by scholars and others provide strong, 
persuasive evidence to courts.106 Private international law involving 
business contracts is also heavily influenced by model codes and guides. 
The International Chamber of Commerce, for example, is a non-gov-
ernmental organization that over the years has produced definitions of 
terms used in international business transactions that are widely ad-
hered to and incorporated into international contracts.107 
Consequently, an important task for those who care about the de-
velopment of law in cyberspace will be to devise model codes, guides to 
good practice, and the like. At this very early stage in the legal history 
of cyberspace, such codes and guides should prove extremely influential 
in future legal disputes. A logical approach to the creation of such 
guides would be to rely on a voluntary task force or committee formed 
in cyberspace and that solicited wide input through the same medium. 
Voluntarily adopted customs can also be enforced through private arbi-
tration. Private commercial arbitration provided by the International 
Chamber of Commerce has been influential in developing a modern-
day "Law Merchant,"108 so that precedent for cyberspace arbitration 
already exists. 
The second basic question with regard to custom is, when do 
courts follow a custom and when do they ignore it? Richard Posner has 
suggested a clear distinction here: courts tend to defer to custom when 
the plaintiff and defendant were already in a contractual relationship, 
and to pay less attention to custom otherwise.109 This makes sense, ac-
cording to Posner, because the custom surrounding a contractual ar-
rangement is likely to be mutually beneficial-else it would have been 
altered by contract. The custom of an industry with regard to those not 
in a contractual relationship, however, is another example of an exter-
nality. There is no particular reason to suppose that an industry custom 
endangering by-standers should receive deference; indeed, imposing lia-
bility when a defendant follows such a custom is precisely what is 
needed to internalize the otherwise external costs of the custom. 
A number of cases support this distinction. The strongest example 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76. 
107. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCOTERMS 1953 (1974 ed.), cited in 
JANIS, supra note 65, at 203 n.16. 
108. See \V. LAWRENCE CRAIG ET AL., J. PAULSSON. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COM· 
MERCE ARBITRATION § 35.01 (2d ed. 1990), cited in JANIS, supra note 65, at 202. 
109. See RICHARD A. POSNER. EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 229-45 (3d ed. 1986). 
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of judicial deference to custom occurs in professional specialization 
cases, typified by medical malpractice cases. Plaintiffs must establish 
that the defendant practitioner failed to meet the standard of custom-
ary medical care.U0 Disputes turn on the establishment of the proper 
custom under the circumstances-not on whether the custom, once 
proved, should be followed. Medical cases, of course, involve parties 
who are in a contractual relationship. 
Contrary examples, where courts are least deferential to industry 
custom, can be found in the products liability area. Note that consum-
ers and by-standers are not in a contractual relationship with manufac-
turers-that was the problem of the "lack of privity" limitation applied 
in products cases.111 Industry custom is relevant in these products 
cases, but it receives less deference than in medical cases.112 
Interestingly, the two most famous examples of courts not defer-
ring to industry custom in the face of a contractual relationship, The 
T.J. Hooper113 and Helling v. Carey,114 were probably just the opposite 
from what they appear to be. The T.J. Hooper involved a tugboat that 
failed to have a radio on board that would have warned the crew of an 
impending storm and saved the tug's tow. Hand assumed that even if 
the lack of a radio was customary in the tug industry, the defendant 
would be held liable anyway, noting in regard to the weight to be given 
custom that "Courts must in the end say what [standard of care] is 
required."115 Helling involved an ophthalmologist who had failed to 
give a routine glaucoma exam to an asymptomatic patient who later 
developed glaucoma. The Washington Supreme Court held the physi-
cian liable despite what it determined to be the custom of ophthalmolo-
gists not to perform such tests.116 
Both cases dealt with parties in a contractual relationship, which 
suggests that the court should have deferred to the industry custom. 
Consistent with Posner's view, however, it appears that in both cases 
110. For medical professionals, "the standard of conduct [is] one of 'good medical practice,' 
which is to say, what is customary and usual in the profession." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 189 (5th ed. 1984). 
111. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 403 (Ex. 1842); MacPherson v. Bu-
ick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916). 
112. "[R]ecent [products] cases ... allow the jury to impose liability upon a defendant 
who has complied with all statutes and common practice .... " RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 77. 
113. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932). 
114. 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974). 
115. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 740. 
116. Helling, 519 P.2d at 982-83. 
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the courts misunderstood the actual custom, which supported rather 
than contradicted the decisions. Despite Hand's assertions, carrying ra-
dios was apparently a widespread tugboat custom;117 medical treatises 
of the Helling time period apparently recommended that ophthalmolo-
gists give exactly ~he sort of routine glaucoma exam that defendants in 
that case failed to give.118 
There seems to be some predictive value, then, in Posner's observa-
tions about custom. How would those observations play out in cyber-
space? Many of the contractual relationships described earlier, such as 
that between user and system administrator, or among system adminis-
trators in a private association arrangement (e.g., the members of a 
computer network) will eventually give rise to disputes about which the 
contract is silent. In these cases, if there is a clear custom, then courts 
can be expected to defer to the custom. 
Suppose, for example, that it becomes customary for system ad-
ministrators to retain messages left on their BBS systems for no more 
than thirty days, though this fact is not expressly communicated to the 
BBS's users. Suppose further that a particular BBS features retail buy-
ing and selling activities well known to the system administrator. A 
BBS user posts a message that involves an offer of contract or an ac-
ceptance of a contract offer, for a specific recipient. The intended recip-
ient of this message does not pick up her mail for over thirty days and 
the system administrator's automated mail clean-up program deletes 
the message. The recipient later learns of this situation and has lost 
money as a result. Thereafter, she sues the system administrator. 
Let us assume that the system administrator is sufficiently familiar 
with the types of messages exchanged on the BBS that the Hadley v. 
Baxenda/e119 rule· on consequential damages is not a limitation on lia-
bility. Should the court defer to the custom of over-thirty day deletion 
of messages? In a word, yes. Here the parties are in a contractual rela-
tionship, there are no significant externalities, and no strong public pol-
icy cutting in either direction. There is every reason for a court to use 
117. There was testimony in the trial court that "90 per cent of the coastwise tugs operating 
along the coast were ... equipped" with radios. The T.J. Hooper, 53 F.2d 107, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 
1931), ajj'd, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.) (Hand. J.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932). 
118. RICHARD POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 288 n.1 (1982) (quot-
ing B. BECKER & R.N. SHAFFER, DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY OF THE GLAUCOMAS 183 (2d ed. 
1961)) and other treatises. 
119. 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854). 
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the industry custom to fill in the contract gaps between user and system 
administrator with an implied thirty-day-delete term.120 
To take a contrary example, suppose it becomes customary for 
cyberspace users freely to forward copies of computer software to a 
wide audience. Perhaps the custom has become solidly entrenched with 
regard to public domain and "shareware" computer programs, with 
those not desiring such free distribution prominently labelling their 
software accordingly. A particular user finds a piece of software to be 
especially helpful, and following the custom, forwards copies to several 
others. Unfortunately, the author of this program has not authorized 
such distribution, but has failed to restrict it explicitly as the custom 
dictates. Should the court defer to the well-established custom of wide 
distribution in the absence of explicit restrictions? Plainly not. If the 
affected party, the author and copyright holder of the program, is not 
in a contractual relationship with those who distributed or received the 
software, there should be no presumption that the custom will be mutu-
ally beneficial to all affected parties and no reason to defer to it. 
F. Defining "Reasonableness" Through Custom 
In general negligence actions, the notion of "reasonableness" often 
plays a crucial part. We have seen already how many possible cyber-
space disputes, such as the theft of financial records and the obligation 
to disclose the theft, will likely turn on the reasonableness of the de-
fendant's actions. Similarly, issues surrounding a system administra-
tor's obligation to label files accurately are likely to turn on the reason-
ableness of the system administrator's behavior. Given that there is 
little basis for a court or jury today to know what in cyberspace is 
"reasonable" and what is not, there is a great deal that cyberspace 
users can do to establish a basis for the determination of 
reasonableness. 
First of all, in garden variety negligence cases what is "reasona-
ble" is often what is "customary." Thus, all that has been said earlier 
about customs in cyberspace applies to the negligence context as well. 
120. See supra text accompanying notes 58-65 for the example of established commercial 
customs overriding other, more general, law from the Law Merchant. However, instances are not 
confined to Medieval times. See, e.g., Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881) (whaling); Titus v. 
Bradford, B. & K. R. Co., 20 A. 517 (Pa. 1890) (railroads); E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Biddell 
Bros., 1912 App. Cas. 18, 22-23 (H.L. 1912) (shipping); Sledd v. Washington Metropolitan Area 
Transit Auth., 439 A.2d 464, 468 (D.C. 1981) (subways); but cf. Mayhew v. Sullivan Mining Co., 
76 Me. 100 (Me. 1884) (mining). 
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That is, custom can be a source of judicially recognized affirmative ob-
ligations, as with the Law Merchant and with public international law, 
but custom can also be an indirect way of establishing what conduct in 
cyberspace is considered "reasonable." 
In short, though reasonableness may be ultimately determined by 
a court, the cyberspace community can do much to influence that ulti-
mate determination. Among other things, just as was true with the es-
tablishment of cyberspace customs, that community can help establish 
reasonableness by developing codes of conduct and guides to "best 
practices" to which various users can voluntarily adhere. System ad-
ministrators, for example, could form system administrator model 
codes that specify obligations regarding the accurate labelling of files. 
Courts often give considerable credence to such codes.121 
Such codes might also specify conduct relative to the forwarding 
of messages. If a model code of behavior required that all messages 
destined for other BBS's users be forwarded without screening, for ex-
ample, perhaps a court's incentive to find system administrators liable 
for forwarding without screening would be reduced. 
G. Must System Administrators Read the Mail? 
Having reviewed the differing levels of behavior regulation that 
might apply in cyberspace, we can now examine the remaining cyber-
space problems, identified earlier in this article, to see whether a self-
help, contractual, or other solution can best resolve any difficulty. The 
first problem is that of the user who uploads a message or file to a BBS 
that is "wrongful"-that is, the message is defamatory or copyright 
infringing or privacy invading, etc. Should the system administrator be 
liable for any harm that results? We are essentially asking whether 
system administrators have a duty to examine and review the materials 
deposited on or flowing through their systems, and more specifically, 
asking what is the most decentralized approach to resolving the issue. 
Let us start with defamatory messages. 
The first recourse of a defamed plaintiff might be unilateral self-
help. If we assume that access to cyberspace will be low cost for all 
who want it-comparable, say, to telephone access today-then the de-
famed plaintiff has an immediate and effective way to rebut defama-
tory statements: answer them through cyberspace communications, the 
121. See generally John M. Winters, The Evidentiary Value of Defendant's Safety Rules 
in a Negligence Action, 38 NEB. L. REv. 906 (1959). 
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same medium in which they were originally published. Technology in 
this instance gives the plaintiff a guaranteed access to the relevant 
"media" for a reply. This access may have the unintended by-product 
of turning every libel plaintiff into a public figure122 under court prece-
dents emphasizing that "public figures" are those who have "ready ac-
cess . . . to mass media of communication . . . to counter criticism of 
their views and activities."123 With comparable rights by defendants 
and plaintiffs to make and reply to libels, the argument to immunize 
the system administrator and leave the whole defamation matter to 
unilateral self-help solutions is strong. 
If pure self-help is not sufficient-it may not be for all defama-
tions and it will not be for copyright infringement or trade secret 
theft-then what is next? The variation in system sizes of BBSs and 
the relative unfamiliarity of courts with the role of the system adminis-
trator continue to argue for a flexible solution, suggesting a contract 
approach. The difficulty here is that a BBS user's behavior with regard 
to third parties is a clear externality. A contract between user and sys-
tem administrator may prohibit wrongful messages, but what happens 
if a user violates the contract, uploads a defamatory or infringing text 
or image, and it is downloaded by others? Injured parties who are not 
in a contractual relationship with either the defendant or the system 
administrator are precisely the problem here. 
The next "level up" for resolution would be to rely on a judicial 
decision or a statute fixing liability or providing immunity for the sys-
tem administrator. Either a case-by-case resolution or a statute seem 
roughly equivalent here. Both would clarify the law, at the expense of 
its (necessarily) greater complexity. A judicial precedent might not be 
quite as predictable as a statute, but judicial decision-making retains a 
correspondingly greater flexibility compared to statutes; future cases in 
which the facts or policy concerns differed significantly can more easily 
lead to appropriately different results than is true with a statute. 
With commercial BBS systems, one approach might be to immu-
nize the system administrator from damages liability. After all, system 
administrators will want to maintain accurate records and deal with 
122. The possibility that a ready reply by defamed plaintiffs might turn every cyberspace 
plaintiff into a public figure for libel law purposes was first suggested by Mike Godwin. Mike 
Godwin, Libel, Public Figures, and the Net, INTERNET WORLD, June 1994 (on file with the Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Law Review). 
123. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring). 
Access to the media is only one factor of several used by courts; for a discussion of those factors, 
see RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION§ 2.09[3] (1991). 
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solvent users or they cannot earn a profit. These records will provide 
injured plaintiffs with the ability to locate these solvent users and pro-
ceed directly against them. Moreover, large commercial systems will 
likely experience a volume of uploads that precludes, as a practical 
matter, screening of messages and files. An action directly against the 
wrongdoing party is thus appropriate, and is precisely what has hap-
pened in one case already,124 where an injured party sued the uploader 
of an allegedly defamatory message to the Prodigy BBS service. 
On the other hand, subscriptions to many large commercial BBS 
systems can be obtained for relatively small amounts of money, some-
times as little as ten to fifteen dollars a month.1215 Users paying this 
little cannot necessarily be equated with "solvent defendants" who 
would be able to respond in damages to defamed or infringed plaintiffs. 
The availability of identifiable solvent defendants is even less cer-
tain with many small, desktop BBSs. Defendant users of such systems 
may not be identifiable or solvent because accurate identification is 
often not a requirement for such systems. Counterbalancing that con-
cern is the fact that smaller systems will more likely be capable of the 
actual screening of uploaded messages and files. Yet, other BBS sys-
tems may not be able to screen due to high volume, but may be able to 
charge a substantial amount for access. Injured plaintiffs would almost 
certainly be able to locate a solvent defendant-user of such a BBS ser-
vice if such a defendant engaged in uploading wrongful messages. 
Once again, we are faced with a situation in which the relevant 
policies and circumstances vary substantially from one BBS to another. 
A uniform rule, whether judicial precedent or statute, would appear to 
be suboptimal in this case: it will be exactly right for some circum-
stances, and unnecessary or inappropriate for others. The ideal here 
would be some form of control that forces the different system adminis-
trators to make their own calculation of "safety" precautions. In other 
words, we would like system administrators with solvent defendants to 
ensure that those defendants are amenable to suit allowing the admin-
istrator to take fewer precautions against wrongful uploads. Other sys-
tem administrators may lack solvent user defendants, but may find it 
feasible to screen uploaded material; we should encourage them to do 
so. 
124. Prodigy User Feels Vindicated After Libel Suit, THE ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 30, 1993, 
at E2. The case was settled. 
125. I have received advertisements with such offers from America OnLine and 
Compuserve. 
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Precisely because the variables of identifiable and solvent user pop-
ulation, the likelihood of wrongful communications, and the ability of 
system administrators to take precautionary measures, are so diverse, 
we need a behavioral control that will bring about the optimal result by 
forcing the relevant parties to determine the best precaution them-
selves, rather than having a court or legislature make it. This is exactly 
the result that is brought about by the imposition of strict liability on 
system administrators. In fact, one of the principle differences between 
negligence liability and strict liability is that strict liability removes the 
cost-benefit calculation from the court and imposes it on defendants.126 
Here that means that strict liability will force the system administrator 
of each BBS service to determine the most advantageous mix of pre-
ventative measures for that BBS, including the need to ensure user sol-
vency, to perform message screening, to limit uploading, and so on. 
This conclusion will doubtless run against the thinking of many 
interested in the legal questions of cyberspace. Yet, strict liability poli-
cies apply nicely in this context. Losses from wrongful messages can be 
spread over all users of the BBS service. If one of the costs of running 
an electronic messaging system is that wrongful messages will damage 
third parties, we would want the system to internalize those external 
costs to make the proper decisions about the scope of activity. In addi-
tion, there is some tendency in the law to hold new activities, whose 
safety is not well understood, to strict liability until more is known 
about them, and that fits well with the new communication services.127 
Would strict liability also mean putting many BBSs out of busi-
ness? It could, but only if system administrators themselves determined 
that the risk of liability exceeded the possibility of indemnification from 
their users or their ability to screen messages ahead of time. Those are 
exactly the circumstances under which injured plaintiffs would other-
wise fail to obtain redress. Conversely, system administrators with 
highly solvent users can contractually shift liability to those users for 
the latter's own conduct through the mechanism of indemnification. 
Smaller BBS services may be able to screen messages and files in some 
instances (such as may have been the case with the photographs at 
issue in the Playboy case), though clearly not in all instances (such as 
126. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 151, 188 (1973) 
(Under strict liability, "(t]here is no need to ask the hard question of which branch of government 
is best able to make cost-benefit determinations, because the matter is left in private hands."). 
127. POSNER, supra note 109, at 163-64. 
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when a user uploads an image or text file that the system administrator 
would have no way of recognizing). 
Even system administrators of services who are unable to shift lia-
bility in this fashion, and are unable as a practical matter to screen 
their messages and files, would not necessarily go out of business. The 
question is whether the benefits of the business, measured either in dol-
lars received from users or satisfaction received by the system adminis-
trator for running the system, exceed the potential liability costs, dis-
counted by their likelihood. If the benefits do exceed the costs, then the 
system administrator would take the risk, paying off judgments when 
necessary. Moreover, the smaller the BBS service, the less likely that 
even the system administrator will be an attractive target for suit-and 
as a practical matter, the small number of users of a small BBS make 
it less likely that wrongful messages will do wide-spread damage. 
Implicit in this proposal to impose strict liability on system admin-
istrators is a crucial predicate. Administrators must be able to adjust 
liability between themselves and their users. That is, they must be able 
to contractually shift liability when they and their users determine that 
such a shift is cost effective. In the case of a BBS, the system adminis-
trator must be able to enforce any indemnification agreements entered 
into by BBS users. The beneficial effects of imposing strict liability on 
system administrators would be lost if courts in practice were to find 
indemnity or other liability-shifting agreements to be unconscionable or 
unenforceable because of unfair bargaining strength or for other rea-
sons. Recall that the fundamental concern behind the imposition of 
such liability is not that system administrators "ought" to screen all 
messages or "ought" to bear all responsibility for their users' message. 
Rather, it is that strict liability forces system administrators, rather 
than courts, to make the calculations of what conduct is worth 
undertaking. 
A BBS administrator and the BBS's users, for example, might mu-
tually determine that a BBS messaging facility was desirable, buy only 
feasible if each user bore his or her own liability for "wrongful" 
messages. An agreement that carried out that conclusion would there-
fore be beneficial to all parties. A court that did not uphold such a 
contractual agreement would force all similar BBSs to shut down-the 
wrong outcome from all parties' perspectives. 
In sum, in the case of wrongful messages uploaded by others, the 
imposition by courts of strict liability on the system administrator, cou-
pled with enforceable indemnity agreements where made between ad-
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ministrators and users, is the option that seems most appropriate. Will 
courts in fact apply strict liability to system administrators? Two im-
pediments appear to stand in the way, the existence of the Electronic 
Communications and Privacy of Act 1986128 ("ECPA"), and the Su-
preme Court's requirement129 that strict liability not apply in defama-
tion cases. The first will prove on closer examination not to prevent the 
imposition of such liability; the second will prevent it in defamation 
cases but not in other cases such as copyright. 
The ECPA specifies that it is unlawful to intercept a private elec-
tronic communication sent over a public messaging system; if a system 
administrator were to read private e-mail intended for others, it ap-
pears that this would constitute the prohibited conduct of "intercepting 
an electronic communication."130 Imposing liability, strict or otherwise, 
on system administrators for "wrongful" messages residing on their 
systems would in effect be imposing a duty on them to read messages 
and thus seems to create a conflict with the ECPA. But the ECPA is 
only a problem in regard to private messages: when messages or files 
are uploaded to "public" areas of a BBS for anyone to read or view, 
then, the ECPA will not be relevant. Thus, imposition of strict liability 
on system administrators for the content of public messages would not 
run afoul of the statute. 
Even with private communications, however, imposition of liabil-
ity-a duty to screen messages-may not be inconsistent with the 
ECPA's prohibition because of two exceptions. First, consent of the 
user is a defense to liability,131 and there is some authority that reason-
able expectations of privacy are imported into the question of con-
sent.132 Many system administrators of BBSs caution users not to ex-
pect privacy of e-mail messages; such a caution might function to 
relieve the administrator from ECPA liability under the "consent" and 
"reasonable expectations" exceptions, and hence would eliminate any 
conflict between that statute and other legal liability. Second, the 
ECP A also exempts the provider of an electronic communications ser-
vice, which would include a BBS, from liability for intercepting com-
128. Pus. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in various sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
129. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
130. "[A]ny person who ... intentionally intercepts ... any ... electronic communica-
tion" is subject to liability. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1988). 
131. See United States v. Barone, 913 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1990) (consent exception applies 
to criminal prosecutions); Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 116-17 (1st Cir. 1990) (consent 
exception applies to civil suits). 
132. See United States v. Carroll, 337 F. Supp. 1260, 1262-63 (D.D.C. 1971). 
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munications when the interception "is a necessary incident . . to the 
protection of the rights ... of the provider of that service."133 If liabil-
ity were imposed on a system administrator for wrongful messages, it 
would then become a necessary incident to the protection of the admin-
istrator's rights that the administrator read the e-mail passing through 
the system. The ECPA exception to liability would therefore apply and 
any conflict between strict liability and the ECPA would be eliminated. 
Among the various kinds of wrongful messages that might appear 
on a BBS, defamatory messages raise an additional issue with regard to 
the system administrator's liability. The Supreme Court has made it 
clear that there are strong First Amendment underpinnings behind a 
scienter requirement for those who only transmit the libels of others.134 
The Cubby court noted these underpinnings,135 though the case appears 
to have turned on the fact that the defamatory material carried on 
Compuserve was placed there by an independent contractor of another 
independent contractor of Compuserve.136 For our purposes, the pres-
ence of an independent contractor means that other solvent defendants 
besides Compuserve were available for suit, lessening the pressure for a 
court to find the system administrator liable. A stronger argument for 
the administrator's liability would be made when no other solvent party 
was available as a defendant. But even here, barring an unlikely rever-
sal of Suprerp.e Court defamation precedents, holding a system admin-
istrator strictly liable for defamatory messages would not be possible 
because of those precedents. Copyright and trade secret cases do not 
wear the same First Amendment armor that defamation cases do. Plac-
ing strict liability on system administrators for wrongful messages of 
those types is therefore an appropriate outcome, much as was reached 
in the Playboy case. 
In all, holding system administrators strictly liable for wrongful 
messages on their systems fits well with the rationale for strict liability 
133. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (1988). 
134. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974). Strict liability was unavail-
able against information distributors like bookstores even before Gertz. See Smith v. California, 
361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959). Note that whether a system administrator is at "fault" (and hence 
can be held liable without violating the Court's "no strict liability" rule) is a bit circular: if the 
law requires monitoring e-mail for defamatory messages, then a system administrator can be de-
scribed as negligent for not doing so. 
135. Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
136. See id. at 140 ("Compuserve carries the publication as part of a forum that is man-
aged by a company unrelated to Compuserve."); id. at 142-43 (discussing and rejecting Com-
puserve's vicarious liability). 
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and is an appropriate outcome for all cases but defamation, where First 
Amendment concerns impose at least a negligence requirement. 
H. Anonymous Messages 
One problem mentioned at the outset of this article was that of 
"anonymous remailer" computers that allow authors to send truly 
anonymous messages to others. The policies applicable to the regulation 
of such messages, when they are wrongful in the ways we have been 
examining, vary somewhat from those applicable to identified 
messages. In particular, anonymous messages bring two competing val-
ues into conflict: One the one hand, there is the desire of the law to 
provide redress to injured plaintiffs who have been defamed or had 
their copyrighted work distributed without authorization. On the other 
hand, there is the desire of individuals to be able to "speak their mind" 
without fear of retribution, a policy primarily applicable to defamatory 
statements, and one certainly furthered by anonymity. 
With reference to the fear of retribution, defamation specifically is 
an area for which the U.S. legal system has to some extent already 
provided an accommodation. The First Amendment generally insulates 
individuals from retaliation for their criticism of the government. Not 
only may the government itself not officially punish such speech, but as 
already discussed, the incorporation of First Amendment restrictions 
into defamation law provides generous protection for libel defend-
ants.137 Thus under, U.S. law, the need to provide for anonymous 
messages in order to permit uninhibited public commentary is much 
less than it might otherwise be. 
Private commentary that is identifiable (not anonymous) exhibits a 
balanced set of incentives. A defamatory message concerning a private 
individual does not invoke any issue of government retaliation, so that 
fear of retaliation is no deterrent to the defendant-defamer. On the 
other hand, the high standard of proof that public figure libel plaintiffs 
must meet does not apply to private figure plaintiffs, so that the threat 
of such a suit is a deterrent to the defendant-defamer.138 
When unidentified, anonymous messages defame private individu-
als, however, the balance disappears. To be sure, the threat of govern-
ment retaliation never existed, and that fact is no different because the 
137. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
138. Private figure plaintiffs must prove the defendant's "fault," but they need not prove 
that the defendant knew the statements were false or were reckless in disregarding truth or falsity. 
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-50 (1974). 
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message is anonymous; but now the threat of a civil defamation suit is 
eliminated because the defendant who defames cannot be identified. In 
economic terms, the "cost" of a privately defamatory communication to 
its author is reduced to near zero by anonymity, leading one to predict 
that the incidence of such communications will rise, perhaps 
dramatically. 
How should the law respond? Recall that we are not talking about 
the defamation issue directly; rather we are asking whether anonymous 
messages, which create the possibility of costless defamation, should be 
permitted. More precisely, we must analyze whether that issue is ap-
propriate for statutory, judicial, contractual, self-help, or other methods 
of control. 
Instinct might dictate that this is an area for judicial or statutory 
control, much like the case of identified defamation discussed above. 
Injured plaintiffs and the defendants who defame them are not in a 
contractual relationship. The plaintiffs are, therefore, "external" to the 
activities in question (the sending of a defamatory message). There is 
no necessarily identifiable group of which both plaintiffs and defend-
ants will be mutually advantaged members and for whom a private as-
sociation and its by-laws might therefore be suitably designed. 
Yet perhaps the context of anonymous defamation is one in which 
injured plaintiffs have an even stronger self-help remedy than was true 
with identified defamation: they can ignore the defamatory remarks or 
rebut them, and they can count on others to sharply discount the de-
famatory remarks. The key here is the recognition that anonymous def-
amation is nearly costless and hence trivially easy to create. When re-
marks are essentially costless, the impact of such remarks on the 
plaintiff's actual reputation will be far less than were the same remarks 
issued from an identified, reputable individual. The outcome here is like 
monetary inflation: when more money is put into circulation, each dol-
lar is worth less. When more defamatory remarks are put into circula-
tion, from no known source, each such remark becomes worth 
less-that is, carries less of a sting and is less harmful. 
The very power of anonymity, in short, is the plaintiff's own pro-
tection, for anonymous remarks will be greatly devalued precisely be-
cause they are anonymous and easy to make. This devaluation will be 
furthered if defamation suits become known to be unfeasible, as pre-
sumably anonymity would make them. Thus, when everyone can de-
fame with impunity, defamation means very little. Coupled with the 
access to the means of effective response that cyberspace provides to 
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plaintiffs, this devalued quality of anonymous defamation argues that 
plaintiffs can unilaterally care for themselves. 
An adequate first response to the issue of anonymous defamatory 
messages is therefore for the legal system to do nothing, trusting in-
stead to individuals' self-help in the form of the plaintiffs defending 
themselves through the same cyberspace medium by which they were 
defamed, and to the general devaluation and lowered importance of de-
famatory messages that are from anonymous sources. 
It is not likely that the self-help solution for anonymous defama-
tion will ever have time to take hold, however, because other remedies 
will be necessary for the problem of anonymous copyright infringe-
ment. Once a copyrighted work has been released into cyberspace, it is 
available for consumption; wide distribution would not devalue it for 
readers, but it would certainly "devalue" the work for authors who 
would lose the opportunity for royalty payments. With infringing works 
distributed by anonymous sources, what remedy could the infringed au-
thor seek? The infringed author is certainly not in a contractual rela-
tionship with the infringer, nor necessarily with a common cyberspace 
service. From the perspective of the infringer, the author is very much 
an external effect of the anonymous distribution of the author's work. 
Is it possible to "internalize" the harms of anonymous copyright 
infringement by contracting at a "higher level" than that existing be-
tween user and system administrator? That is, although an infringed 
author is not privy to the contract between the anonymous remailer's 
system administrator and the anonymous infringer, the system adminis-
trator could be in a contractual relationship with all other BBSs in the 
network. Perhaps that contract can form the basis for a limitation on 
forwarding copyright infringing works through the network. 
The difficulty with this approach is that the mutuality of benefits 
that characterizes association by-laws does not apply here. Very likely 
all members of the association will not see themselves as copyright au-
thors-perhaps few if any will. The need for limitations on anonymous 
forwarding of copyright infringing material will therefore lack the ap-
peal of, say, requirements to forward mail generally, which has clear 
benefits for all parties. 
It seems apparent that neither self-help nor contract-based solu-
tions will be of much service in this copyright matter. That suggests 
either of two remaining options. The first is an outright statutory prohi-
bition on "anonymous remailers," the BBSs that provide the anony-
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mous message mechanism; the second, as proposed earlier,139 is to im-
pose strict liability on the system administrators of such facilities. The 
case for the system administrator's strict liability is certainly strong 
here: to put the matter informally, the system administrator of an 
anonymous facility looks like the "bad guy" and will not be a sympa-
thetic defendant in court. 
One further complication clouds the picture. It is possible that 
BBSs in cyberspace might function as anonymous remailers some of 
the time, and not others. They might, therefore, be difficult to identify. 
More particularly, it may be difficult to identify from which of several 
anonymous remailers a given copyright infringing work was distrib-
uted. Plaintiffs might be able to find a court congenial to the applica-
tion of strict liability, but not be able to find a defendant to whom it 
should apply. 
This complication leads to the final conclusion that the only effec-
tive deterrent to the problems of anonymous remailers will be to pro-
hibit them altogether. This is, in terms of the various levels of behav-
ioral regulation discussed in this article, a rather drastic solution, but 
the sharp externalities and the problems of identifying the BBS origins 
of anonymous messages suggest that this will prove to be the only re-
course. Because of the ease with which messages in cyberspace may be 
routed across national borders, it is also likely that some form of inter-
national cooperation, such as a treaty, will be necessary for the prohibi-
tion to be effective. 
I. International Torts 
We have been discussing the liability of system administrators of 
anonymous remailer facilities for "wrongful" messages. Even without 
regard to the arguable wrong-doing of an intermediary like the system 
administrator, cyberspace as a conduit permits wrongful messages to be 
sent internationally with ease. 
Without cyberspace, it is today possible for a citizen of one coun-
try to commit a tort with regard to a plaintiff in another country. The 
easiest example is our familiar one of defamation. A citizen of country 
X can mail letters to country Y defaming a citizen of that country. As 
a practical matter, however, this does not seem to occur with any fre-
quency. Yet with cyberspace, the possibilities seem far less remote. For 
one thing, cyberspace makes it dramatically easier for citizens in one 
139. See supra text accompanying notes 126-38. 
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nation to get to know citizens of other nations. This is in fact a strik-
ingly common occurrence on the Internet already today. The extremely 
low cost of cyberspace communication makes practical the distribution 
of defamatory or other wrongful communications on a scale not before 
possible.14° For these reasons, the issue of international torts is likely to 
be much more significant in cyberspace than it has been to date in real 
space. 
What is the "lowest level" solution for this problem? By hypothe-
sis we are talking about torts, that is, wrongful conduct typically di-
rected toward strangers, so the contract approach is ruled out. To be 
sure, as with anonymous defamation, self-help in the form of ignoring 
or responding is eminently possible, but now we are talking about iden-
tified wrongdoers, not anonymous ones. Furthermore, the sting of a 
libelous communication from an identified source is likely to be greater 
than from an anonymous one. Moreover, other wrongful communica-
tions besides defamation are readily possible, including disclosure of 
trade secrets and copyright infringement. For these wrongs, ignoring or 
replying to the wrongful communication is no answer. 
With the broad international scope of this problem, it is tempting 
to look toward international agencies like the United Nations to devise 
appropriate rules. But international agencies have no authoritative ju-
risdiction; when international courts hear cases, it is typically between 
sovereign nations who have consented to jurisdiction because they see 
themselves as repeat players on the international scene. An individual 
in Singapore defamed by an individual in Nebraska is not likely to 
have access to the World Court, even if international defamation rules 
were promulgated. Local courts in Nebraska would be prohibitively ex-
pensive for the Singapore plaintiff; Singapore courts prohibitive for the 
Nebraska defendant. Trade secret theft is more likely to involve busi-
nesses with the ability to bring suit, but again, pursuing a foreign de-
fendant overseas will in many cases simply not be economically 
feasible. 
Instances like these suggest, though it may seem a bit odd, that 
cyberspace users form their own virtual courts. How such a court 
140. A recent case in Australia demonstrates the reality of this scale of distribution. The 
defendant wrote a defamatory message about an Australian university professor who had been 
denied tenure. This message was distributed to an estimated 23,000 world-wide members of a 
cyberspace discussion group. The court's judgment, entered when the defendant defaulted and 
which recapitulated the defamatory message, was itself also circulated to an untold number of 
Internet users, including the author. See Rindos v. Hardwick, unreported judgment 940164 (Su-
preme Court of Western Australia) 31 March 1994. 
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would work mechanically is not entirely clear at this point, but the de-
sirability of such action for just such circumstances as we are discuss-
ing seems indisputable. The capability of communications networks is 
rapidly growing; almost certainly audio and full-motion video will be 
routinely available to cyberspace users in a matter of few years. It is 
easily possible to imagine on-line cyberspace hearings, with judges, ju-
ries, attorneys, and whatever assortment of bailiffs and observers might 
be appropriate. The sanctions imposed could be the usual private asso-
ciation sanction of expulsion or suspension from the relevant part of 
cyberspace. 
To be sure, such a court system and its threat of expulsion would 
require a great deal of international cooperation among a wide array of 
groups. Yet the cooperation would be cost-effective if the resulting 
structure served to resolve many disputes over many years. Cost (in-
cluding time and effort) is only important relative to the value of the 
object sought, and a cyberspace court system might prove extremely 
valuable. Besides, much of the cost of setting up an internationally co-
ordinated set of procedures and rules is incurred in communicating 
back and forth among those who are engaged in the project-and 
cyberspace is nothing if not a low-cost means for communicating 
internationally. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Some of the legal problems of cyberspace are indistinguishable 
from those that arise in real space. For the most part, these situations 
are characterized by the use of cyberspace as merely another means of 
transmission from individuals directly to other individuals. Defamatory 
e-mail messages from "A" to "B" in regard to "C" are no different 
from defamatory letters or phone calls. 
Cyberspace does raise other interesting legal questions that are 
new enough to merit attention and to call for solutions. "Newness" 
here means that some sort of legal solution tailored to the cyberspace 
problem will bring clarity and predictability to the rules attending 
cyberspace conduct, the benefits of which outweigh the additional com-
plexity thereby added to the legal system, or that the underlying policy 
concerns of "real space" law are inappropriate when applied to activi-
ties in cyberspace. 
The questions that are "new" in this sense come in several vari-
eties. Some are new not because they are unprecedented in real space, 
but rather because they will occur so much more frequently in cyber-
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space that a clearer resolution is required. The ease with which anony-
mous messages can be sent in cyberspace is one example. 
Other legal problems of cyberspace will be new in a stronger sense, 
such as questions that turn on the reasonableness of behavior when 
"reasonableness" in this new medium is yet ill-defined. Still other 
problems will be worth addressing as new because they invoke the new 
role of the "system administrator" as a communications intermediary. 
System administrators function in cyberspace something like book-
stores, something like telephone companies, something like publishers 
. . . and something like none of these. That makes their rights and 
obligations difficult to define. 
The definition of rights and obligations generally in cyberspace 
can be accomplished in a variety of ways. The obvious ways are the 
"top down" implementation of rules through legislative enactment or 
judicial decision. But countless varieties of other, "bottom up" rule 
making processes are also workable. Unilateral self help (individuals 
avoid exposure to that which they do not like), contracts, private as-
sociations (which are contracts in the form of by-laws designed to out-
last the individuals who form them), and the development of customs, 
are all mechanisms by which behavior in cyberspace might be 
regulated. 
The decision as to which of these several mechanisms is most ap-
propriate for the different problems of the law relating to cyberspace is 
best made by applying a presumption of decentralization: the most flex-
ible, least intrusive rule-making process is best because communica-
tions technology is changing so rapidly. This presumption means that 
the first answer to how a legal problem in cyberspace should be solved 
is to "do nothing." That is, let the affected individuals withdraw from 
activities they do not like. 
Cases in which unilateral self-help are inappropriate are often self-
correcting: individuals who can further their interests best through co-
operative rather than unilateral behavior will naturally turn to con-
tracts as the second level of behavior regulation. Contracts can govern 
a wide variety of problems in cyberspace and should form the basic 
control mechanism for much cyberspace activity. 
Contracts cease to function well when they create or allow signifi-
cant external effects, such as when a user of a cyberspace service like 
electronic mail on a bulletin board system uses the service to store de-
famatory or other wrongful messages in regard to third parties. In 
cases like these where the primary effect is harm to third parties, exter-
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nal to any contracts, the only solution will be a statutory or judicial 
one. 
